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[361] 
Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: 
Domestic Activities, Foreign Activities, or 
None of the Above 
Eric M. Zolt* 
Warren Buffett, Bill Gates, and sixty-seven other billionaires have pledged to give a 
majority of their wealth for charitable purposes. The total dollar amount of potential 
funding for charitable activities is staggering. So is the potential loss of tax revenue. 
Because of past, current, and future tax benefits, U.S. taxpayers have funded and will 
fund a substantial portion of these charitable activities without any input in how the 
money is spent. These billionaires are not just being generous with their own money, 
but with the money of the American people. 
 
Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize charitable activities and allow donors to 
dictate how funds are spent? This Article seeks to contribute to the debate on the 
desirability of charitable tax deductions by focusing on a smaller part of the charitable 
tax world: charitable deductions for foreign assistance. Tax benefits for foreign 
assistance raise several of the same issues that arise in the purely domestic context, as 
well as issues that may be less important or absent in the subsidizing of domestic 
charitable activities. 
 
Recent scholarship has argued for continuing to allow tax benefits to foreign charitable 
activities, and for extending charitable tax benefits to foreign charities and to for-profit 
entities engaged in charitable activities. These arguments rest partly on the notion that 
there is no meaningful way to distinguish these activities or entities from domestic 
charities engaged in domestic charitable activities. These scholars may be right in 
arguing for consistent tax treatment for domestic and foreign charitable activity, but 
they may be wrong in their conclusions. The best approach may be to consider changes 
to the current charitable-deduction regime for both domestic and foreign charitable 
activities and to consider other alternatives for the government to provide financial 
support and other incentives for charitable activities. 
 
 *  Michael H. Schill Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. 
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Introduction 
Linda Evangelista, the Canadian supermodel, once famously noted 
that she and fellow supermodel Christy Turlington did not wake up for 
less than $10,000 a day, then the top rate for going down the catwalk.1 I 
 
 1. Jackie Bolin & David Ninh, Learning Fashionese: You, Too, Can Speak Like a Fashionista, 
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admire her candor. Economists refer to this as the “reservation wage”—a 
useful concept in thinking about the labor-leisure trade-off.2 I have often 
wanted to ask Ms. Evangelista whether the $10,000 was before or after 
taxes.3 
Warren Buffett, Bill Gates, and sixty-seven other billionaires4 have 
pledged to give a majority of their wealth for charitable purposes.5 Like 
many others, I admire their generosity and their willingness to give back 
to a society that has helped them achieve their success. And again, I want 
to ask these individuals whether the amounts pledged are calculated 
before or after taxes. The difference is substantial. Even with the 
extended Bush tax cuts and the new estate tax regime, past, current, and 
future income, gift, and estate tax benefits may result in tax subsidies 
between 35–70% of the amounts contributed.6 A rough calculation for 
these sixty-nine billionaires yields a potential loss of tax revenue of over 
 
Dall. Morning News, July 26, 2001, at 1C. 
 2. See generally Jerry A. Hausman, Taxes and Labor Supply, in 1 Handbook of Public 
Economics 213 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985). 
 3. Ms. Evangelista made the comment in 1990, when the combined marginal federal, New York 
state, New York City, and payroll tax rate was in excess of 45%, assuming an individual filer in the 
maximum tax bracket. E.J. McMahon, Pricing the “Luxury Product”: New York City Taxes Under 
Mayor Bloomberg, 47 Civ. Rep., Nov. 2005, at fig.3; History of Federal Individual Income Bottom and 
Top Bracket Rates, Nat’l Taxpayers Union, http://www.ntu.org/tax-basics/history-of-federal-
individual-1.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); N.Y. St. Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 1990 New York State 
Tax Table for Forms IT-200, IT-201 and IT-203 (1990). 
 4. Unlike geese, baboons, lions, fish, dogs, whales, ships, and trucks, no collective noun has yet 
emerged to describe a group of billionaires. The New Oxford American Dictionary (2001). Perhaps, 
a “bevy of billionaires.” Professor Len Burman suggests a “flush of billionaires.” Email from Len 
Burman, Professor, Syracuse University, to Eric M. Zolt (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with the Author). 
 5. A list of individuals who have taken the Giving Pledge can be found at http://givingpledge.org/ 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2011). Appendix A, infra, provides a current list of the individuals who pledged 
and an estimate of their current wealth.  
 6. For those donors who realize no income tax benefits from charitable contributions, the tax 
subsidy is 35% (the relief from gift and estate tax liability). For donors with substantial income tax 
liability, the tax subsidy rate could be over 70%. This estimated tax benefit assumes a federal income 
tax rate of 35%, a state income tax rate of 6%, a capital gains rate of 15%, and a federal estate tax rate 
of 35%. It also assumes that the donation is funded with appreciated stock with a basis equal to 10% 
of the fair market value at the date of contribution. If the charitable gift were made in cash or stock 
held until death (thus, not subject to capital gains tax), the subsidy rate is 60%. Both of these examples 
also assume that the limits on annual charitable deductions (50% of adjusted gross income for cash 
and 30% of adjusted gross income for appreciated stock or, in the case of donations to private 
foundations, 30% of adjusted gross income for cash and 20% of adjusted gross income for appreciated 
stock) are not applicable.  
For many billionaires, the tax savings from charitable contributions will be a smaller percentage 
of the amounts contributed because their effective state and federal income tax rates are well below 
the maximum statutory rate. IRS data for 2008 for the 400 households with the highest gross income 
shows that the effective tax rate for this group (which may or may not reflect those individuals subject 
to the pledge) was 18.1% of gross income, as over half of the gains for taxpayers in this group were 
from capital gains and dividends that are subject to a maximum tax rate of 15%. IRS, The 400 
Individual Income Tax Returns Reporting the Highest Adjusted Gross Incomes Each Year, 
1992–2008, at 10 (2011). 
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$110 billion.7 So, one way of looking at the pledge is that these 
billionaires are not just being generous with their money, but with the 
money of the American people. 
Americans, even those who are not billionaires, are generous. We 
donate more money (and often highly appreciated property) to fund 
charitable activities, both in the U.S. and abroad, than taxpayers in any 
other country.8 Charities fulfill many important functions in our society, 
and in many cases relieve the government of the responsibility of 
addressing important social, economic, and cultural functions. Tax 
benefits, particularly the charitable tax deduction for individuals and 
corporations, play an important role in the success and viability of the 
nonprofit sector. No doubt, donors are more generous than they would 
be in a world without tax subsidies, perhaps even by an amount greater 
than the lost tax revenue.9 
It is curious, though, that despite the long lineage of the charitable 
deduction, we lack a comprehensive, coherent theory that explains 
successfully why governments should allow tax deductions to subsidize 
the current collection of qualified charitable activities and charitable 
organizations.10 It is not from lack of trying.11 Early tax theories were 
donor-focused, positing that income transferred for charitable purposes 
was not personal consumption and, as it was no longer in the control of 
the donor, should be excluded from tax.12 Other theories claim that the 
charitable tax deduction helps correct market or political failures in our 
society.13 Thus, tax benefits help increase the amount of collective goods 
or services that are otherwise underprovided because of free-rider and 
other challenges.14 The charitable tax deduction also helps decentralize 
the spending process by allowing the minority to overcome the 
preferences of the majority or the vagaries of the political process in 
spending tax dollars, merely by contributing some of their own money to 
projects that they deem worthy of broader support.15 But even if one 
 
 7. The $110 billion is a very rough estimate arrived at by looking at an estimate of the total 
wealth of individuals signing the pledge (roughly $330 billion), an assumed level of donations of two-
thirds of wealth, and an assumed income, gift, and estate tax benefit of 50%. 
 8. See Charities Aid Foundation, International Comparisons of Charitable Giving 2 (2006). 
 9. Gerald E. Auten et al., The Effect of Tax Reform on Charitable Contributions, 45 Nat’l Tax 
J. 267, 288 (1992); David Joulfaian, Estate Taxes and Charitable Bequests by the Wealthy, 53 Nat’l Tax 
J. 746, 761–62 (2000). 
 10. David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 531, 547 (2006). 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 14. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1393 (1988).  
 15. Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector 
Economy, in The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy 21, 23 
(Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986); see also Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387, 402 
(1998).  
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were convinced that the charitable deduction was intended to address the 
problems identified by these theories, it is not clear that the charitable 
deduction in its current form is the best way of addressing these failures. 
There are real gains from using the tax system to subsidize 
charitable activities. Supporters note both the diversity and the higher 
quality of charitable goods and services that come from programs funded 
by individuals who devote money, and often time and expertise, in 
selecting, managing, and monitoring activities that often benefit society 
at large, rather than those programs selected by some Washington 
bureaucrat and managed and monitored by government employees.16 
But these also are costs. The cost in terms of forgone revenue from 
federal tax benefits to individuals and corporations for contributing to 
charitable activities is substantial: an estimated $37 billion for 2010 and 
an estimated $246 billion for fiscal years 2010–2014.17 The tax cost of 
exempting qualifying activities of tax-exempt organizations from income 
tax is not included in the list of tax expenditures, but may be about $10 
billion a year.18 There are also costs associated with charities behaving 
badly.19 The IRS approves virtually all applications for tax-exempt 
status,20 and state attorneys general lack the resources or interest to 
monitor the activities of charitable operations within their jurisdictions. 
Thus there is little monitoring to ensure charities are actually being 
charitable. There also may be substantial opportunity costs, as federal 
funds used to support charitable activities chosen by donors perhaps 
could have been better spent on other government programs or on 
charitable activities selected by a different process. Finally, there are 
costs related to allowing a minority to dictate how federal funds are 
spent. For just about any activity or cause for which a charitable 
organization exists, there are supporters and detractors—whether it is 
funding for opera, different religions and religious activity, or questions 
involving controversial subjects like funding for Planned Parenthood, the 
Westboro Baptist Church, or USC football.21 
 
 16. Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable 
Contributions, in Economics of Nonprofit Institutions, supra note 15, at 224, 238 (noting that 
wealthy donors are more likely to donate expertise in addition to money, as opposed to less well-off 
charitable individuals).  
 17. Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, 111th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for 
Fiscal Years 2010–2014, at 43–48 (Comm. Print 2010). 
 18.  Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Two-Edged 
Sword?, in Nonprofit & Government: Collaboration & Conflict 141, 148–49 (Elizabeth T. Boris & 
C. Eugene Steurle eds., 2d ed. 2006); see also Harvey P. Dale, Foreign Charities, 48 Tax Law. 655, 658–
59 (1995). 
 19. Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Towards Decay, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 1, 
19 (2011). 
 20.  IRS, Pub. 55B, Data Book, 2008, at 55 (2009). 
 21. Internal Revenue Code section 170(l) allows donors to deduct 80% of contributions made to 
universities (often limited by the university to contributions made to athletic programs) to secure elite 
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Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize charitable activities? One 
approach is simply to ask whether we are better off with the current tax 
regime than we would be without it: the “take or leave it” approach. 
Donors do a lot of good things that local or federal governments would 
or could not do, and it may be worth the potential financial and other 
costs to obtain these good works. While we lack a single theory that 
marries tax subsidies to the current collection of qualified charitable 
activities and charitable organizations, the existing tax regime offers a 
well-accepted set of trade-offs that results in diversity, pluralism, and 
even cacophony that are important in our society.22 In a world of 
imperfect information and political economy challenges, providing 
matching federal funds through the charitable deduction may be the best 
approach to increase the level of underprovided goods and services in a 
liberal, democratic society, such as ours. 
Alternatively, one can imagine a “bang for the buck” approach, 
designing government assistance for charitable activities in a way that 
maximizes the return for amount of government funds expended. This 
could include measures such as narrowing the definition of qualified 
charitable activities to claim deductions for contributions, matching 
deductions for specific activities rather than entities, converting the 
charitable deduction into a credit, or adopting targeted grants or credits 
to support specific charitable activities. 
A few years ago, this was just an academic (in the pejorative sense 
of the word) question. But in just five years, the charitable tax deduction 
has gone from politically untouchable23 to potential collateral (or not so 
collateral) damage in the name of fundamental tax reform. In his 2010 
budget, President Barack Obama proposed limiting the tax benefits for 
high-income taxpayers for personal deductions, including the charitable 
deduction, as a revenue-raising proposal.24 Two recent reform proposals 
go further and seek to repeal many personal deductions, replacing the 
charitable tax deduction with a credit, as a means to dramatically 
increase the tax base so that tax rates can be reduced.25 Additionally, the 
 
status that allows them preferential tickets to athletic events. I.R.C. § 170(l) (2010). 
 22. Harvey P. Dale, Commentary on Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: 
Domestic Activities, Foreign Activities, or None of the Above, Presentation at the NYU School of 
Law Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance (Mar. 10, 2011) (on file with the Author). 
 23. President George W. Bush charged his 2005 tax reform advisory panel to recognize “the 
importance of homeownership and charity in American society,” a not-so-subtle recommendation to 
preserve tax benefits for mortgage interest and charitable deductions. President’s Advisory Panel on 
Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System 41 
(2005). 
 24. The Obama budget proposal would allow donors to deduct an amount equal to 28% of their 
contributions, even if their marginal tax rate exceeded 28%. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office 
of the President, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise 29 (2009). 
 25. See Debt Reduction Task Force, Restoring America’s Future: Reviving the Economy, 
Cutting Spending and Debt, and Creating a Simple, Pro-Growth Tax System 33 (2010) (proposing 
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Congressional Budget Office has recently evaluated eleven proposals for 
changing the tax incentives of charitable giving.26 
This Article seeks to contribute to the debate on the desirability of 
the charitable tax deduction by focusing on a smaller part of the 
charitable tax world—charitable deductions for foreign assistance. 
Charitable tax benefits for foreign assistance raise many of the same key 
issues that arise in the purely domestic context, such as the relative 
worthiness of competing charitable projects, the mandatory participation 
by the indirect taxpayer-donors in projects favored by those who are 
willing to contribute their own funds, questions of monitoring and 
enforcement, and the use of for-profit entities to achieve charitable 
purposes. 
Tax benefits for foreign assistance also raise several issues that may 
be less important or absent in subsidizing domestic activities. For 
example, if part of the rationale for tax benefits for charitable activity 
rests on the underprovision of certain collective goods or services in a 
society, using funds from Country A to support activities in Country B 
may be problematic. In addition, using tax subsidies for foreign 
assistance may support activities that are at odds with U.S. government 
policies in a particular country or region. Finally, the existing theories of 
charitable contributions assume a simple three-sector model with 
government, a private sector, and a nonprofit sector that are part of a 
single society in which voting, contributions, and subsidies takes place.27 
Cross-border charitable assistance involves more actors (multilateral 
institutions, bilateral donors, foreign governments, and foreign charities) 
and more preferences (recipient country and its citizens) than domestic 
charitable activity. 
The following examples may be useful in thinking about the issues 
raised in this Article: 
• Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize contributions made to 
domestic charities to support assistance to victims of Hurricane 
Katrina? (domestic charities with domestic activities) 
• Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize contributions made to 
domestic charities to support assistance to victims of the Japanese 
earthquake and tsunami? (domestic charities with foreign 
activities) 
 
to replace the existing charitable deduction with a 15% refundable credit that would be paid to the 
qualifying charity rather than to the donor-taxpayer); Nat’l Comm. on Fisc. Resp. & Ref., Co-Chairs’ 
Proposal 22–27 (2010) (proposing to replace the existing charitable deduction with a 12% credit for 
charitable contributions in excess of 2% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income; for those billionaires 
with low marginal tax rates and relatively low adjusted gross income, the credit may yield greater tax 
saving than the existing charitable-deduction regime). 
 26. Cong. Budget Off., Pub. No. 4030, Options for Changing the Tax Treatment of 
Charitable Giving 9–19 (May 2011). 
 27. See, e.g., Weisbrod, supra note 15. 
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• Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize contributions made to 
Japanese charities to support assistance to victims of the Japanese 
earthquake and tsunami? (foreign charities with foreign activities) 
• Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize contributions made to 
for-profit entities engaged in charitable activities? (for-profit 
charities, regardless of the domesticity of their organization or 
activities) 
These are important questions. But current charitable, economic, 
and legal scholarship provide relatively little guidance in determining 
whether to allow charitable deductions to support charitable activities 
outside the U.S., to support foreign charities, and to support for-profit 
entities that engage in charitable activities. And perhaps the failure of 
the current scholarship to lead us to answers on foreign charitable 
activities should lead us to question the regime it supports domestically. 
Congress adopted much of the current tax regime covering 
qualifications for tax-exempt status and the deductibility of charitable 
contributions when most U.S. taxpayers were focusing little attention on 
foreign charitable activities. It is time to examine the current tax regime 
that applies to foreign charitable assistance and whether, or how, it 
should be changed, by focusing on three key questions: (1) Should tax 
benefits support charitable activities outside the U.S.? (2) Should the tax 
system treat foreign charities differently from domestic charities? 
(3) Should the tax system extend charitable tax benefits to for-profit 
entities engaged in charitable activities, including activities outside the 
U.S.? 
The extension of the charitable deduction to foreign activities or 
for-profit charities, then, becomes an incremental decision: We have a 
deduction for domestic charitable activities, so why not for foreign 
charitable activities or for-profit entities engaged in charitable activities? 
But to answer that question, we must know whether foreign charitable 
activities and for-profit charities are sufficiently similar to domestic 
charitable activities in the characteristics that warrant the charitable 
deduction. So, we must know why we have a domestic charitable 
deduction. 
Here is the rub. The existing scholarship does not offer a coherent 
theory for the domestic charitable deduction, and certainly not one 
robust enough to cover the current collection of qualified charitable 
activities and charitable organizations, either normatively or descriptively. 
Perhaps attempting to solve the question of whether to extend the 
domestic charitable deduction to foreign activities (or for-profit 
charities) provides us with the chance to evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of our current policy approach and to consider alternatives. 
Starting with a clean slate, strong arguments can be made that the best 
way for the U.S. government to help achieve social goals in foreign 
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countries is not by offering to match amounts contributed to causes 
selected by donors. Similarly, it may be that the best way to engage for-
profit entities in charitable activities is not by granting them tax-exempt 
status or allowing supporters of these entities to deduct amounts 
contributed to fund these activities. This exercise—the design of the 
mechanisms to achieve social goals outside the U.S. and to engage for-
profit entities both in the U.S. and abroad—may provide useful insights 
about whether we should keep our current tax regime for domestic 
charitable deductions or consider other alternatives. 
Recent scholarship has argued for continuing to allow tax benefits 
to overseas charitable activities,28 and for extending charitable tax 
benefits to foreign charities29 and for-profit charities.30 These arguments 
rest partly on the idea that favorable tax treatment should follow because 
there is no meaningful way to distinguish these activities or entities from 
domestic charities engaged in domestic charitable activities.31 While these 
scholars may be right in arguing for consistent tax treatment for 
contributions made to support domestic and foreign charitable activities, 
they may be wrong in supporting the charitable deduction as that choice 
of tax treatment. Perhaps the best approach is to consider changes to the 
current charitable-deduction regime for all charitable activities and to 
consider other alternatives for government support and incentives for 
charitable activities. 
In Part I, this Article undertakes a brief review of the charitable tax 
landscape and the consequences of using the tax system as a vehicle for 
supporting many types of charitable activities. Part II examines whether 
tax benefits should support charitable activities outside the U.S. Part III 
reviews whether the tax law should treat foreign charities differently 
from domestic charities. Part IV examines whether tax benefits should be 
extended to for-profit entities that engage in charitable activities. The 
Conclusion looks at the implications for the domestic charitable 
deduction raised by these problems. 
I.  The Charitable Tax Landscape 
At a general level, there are two major types of tax benefits 
accorded entities engaged in charitable activity. First, the tax law 
provides an exemption from income tax for organizations that are 
organized and operated for certain qualifying purposes and that are 
subject to a “nondistribution constraint,” whereby earnings cannot 
 
 28. Pozen, supra note 10, at 600–01. 
 29. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 18, at 696. 
 30. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 Va. L. Rev. 2017, 2042–
45 (2007). 
 31. See, e.g., id. at 2029–56; Pozen, supra note 10, at 588-94.  
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benefit any private shareholder or individual.32 Second, the tax law allows 
individuals and corporations to claim tax deductions for charitable 
contributions made to qualified organizations.33 Individuals can deduct 
the value of the contributions against income, gift, and estate taxes.34 
Additional tax benefits apply to gifts of appreciated property, as 
taxpayers can generally avoid the capital gains tax on donated property 
while deducting the fair market value from a portion of their taxable 
income.35 
In thinking about tax deductions for charitable activities both within 
and outside the U.S., it may be useful to start with this exercise: Imagine 
there are $50 billion in government funds available each year to support 
charitable activities. How should those funds be allocated? Ideally, from 
a utilitarian standpoint, the funds would be used to encourage those 
activities with the greatest social returns.36 The gains from the charitable 
activities would reflect both the worthiness of purpose and the efficiency 
of performance.37 This “comparable worthiness” approach would rank 
competing projects and fund those activities and organizations that have 
the greatest potential gains.38 
The framework below sets forth different combinations of funding 
and allocation decisions that reflect the public and private nature of 
using tax deductions to subsidize charitable activities.39 
 
 32. Several different types of organizations qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501 of the 
Internal Revenue Code. Section 501(c)(3) provides for eight categories of organizations that qualify 
for tax-exempt status. See generally Richard Schmalbeck, Reforming Uneven Subsidies in the 
Charitable Sector, 66 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 237 (2010). Most entities qualify for tax exemption by 
being organized and operated for religious, charitable, or educational purposes. Other qualifying 
activities include entities organized for scientific, public-safety testing, or literary purposes, and 
organizations intended to foster national, or international amateur sports competition, or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals. There are also prohibitions on political campaign activity 
and excessive lobbying. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 33. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (2010). 
 34. See Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations 32–35 (10th ed. 2011); see 
also I.R.C. §§ 170(a), 2055(a)(2), 2522(a) (2010). 
 35. Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of 
Built-In Gains, 56 Tax L. Rev. 1, 10 (2002). In addition to these two types of tax benefits, tax-exempt 
entities may also have access to tax-exempt financing, which can substantially reduce the cost of 
borrowing. Tax-exempt entities also may qualify for state and local income tax, sales tax, and property 
tax benefits. See generally Brody & Cordes, supra note 18. 
 36. Schmalbeck, supra note 32, at 237. 
 37. Id. at 245–47. 
 38. It would be very difficult to implement this approach as it would require some consensus for 
determining the relative worthiness of different charitable activities and for determining and 
measuring the effectiveness of performance. Id. at 250–51. 
 39. This framework was suggested by Mitchell Kane in his Commentary on Eric M. Zolt, Tax 
Aspects of Private Development Assistance, Presentation at NYU School of Law Rubin International 
Law Symposium (Dec. 4, 2009), available at http://iilj.org/research/documents/Zolt.ppt. 
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Table 1: Combinations of Funding and Allocation Decisions 
  Funding Alternatives





Unmatched portion of 
charitable contributions 






restrictions on the use of 
private funds) 
Direct government 
programs (such as official 
development assistance to 
foreign countries) 
 
The upper left box reflects the use by individuals or corporations of 
their own funds to support activities they choose. This is the after-tax 
cost of charitable contributions (so if an individual is in the 35% marginal 
tax bracket and makes a $1,000 contribution, the value of the tax 
deduction is $350 and the after-tax cost would be $650). For those 
individuals who receive no tax benefits for their contributions, either 
because they do not itemize deductions or have no tax liability, the full 
amount of their contribution would be included in this box. 
The upper right box reflects the tax benefits associated with the 
contribution. Here private actors determine how public funds are 
allocated. Who needs Senators Barbara Boxer or Dianne Feinstein? I 
can get my own private earmark to support medical services to combat 
cholera in Haiti simply by writing a check to the U.S. affiliate of Doctors 
Without Borders (Médécins Sans Frontières). 
The bottom left box reflects government regulation that influences 
the use of private funds for charitable purposes. This includes both 
incentives for funding certain types of activities and organizations and 
disincentives and prohibitions against certain types of activities, such as 
expenditures that may jeopardize an organization’s tax-exempt status or 
that may result in excise taxes for private foundations.40 
Finally, the bottom right box reflects public actors spending public 
funds. This could be Congress deciding directly how funds from general 
tax revenues should be spent or delegating spending decisions to specific 
government agencies, such as the Department of State, or to some band 
of experts, such as the governing boards of the National Science 
Foundation or the National Endowment of the Arts. The key insight is 
that the decision to provide federal funds for charitable activities can be 
separated from the decision of who gets to decide how federal funds are 
spent. 
 
 40. See I.R.C. § 4945 (2010); Private Foundations—Taxable Expenditures (Sec. 4945), Tax Mgmt. 
Portfolio (BNA) No. 474 (2008). 
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But the charitable deduction is not just about funding worthwhile 
projects. The $50 billion of government funds could be used to create 
incentives for private actors to contribute not just their money, but their 
ideas, their expertise, and their ability to monitor activities. These 
behavioral effects lead to targeting incentives to increase the level of 
marginal giving and participation.41 Perhaps this justifies using the tax 
system to target matching grants to the rich (high-bracket taxpayers) 
rather than the middle class or the poor.42 
Viewing the charitable deduction as a matching grant program 
sponsored by the federal government highlights some of the undesirable 
aspects of the current tax regime.43 Because the matching grant program 
is run through the federal income tax system, only some donations get 
matched and how much gets matched depends on the contributor’s 
income tax rate.44 Most notably, only those who itemize deductions for 
tax purposes have their charitable deductions matched by the federal 
government.45 This often means that upper-middle-income and high-
income taxpayers get tax benefits from charitable contributions, but 
middle-income and low-income taxpayers do not. Individuals can dictate 
how some of the roughly $50 billion in annual federal matching funds are 
spent, but they must contribute their own funds and itemize their 
deductions to get a say in the allocation. 
The current tax system sets the marginal reimbursement rate for 
charitable contributions (the subsidy amounts) equal to the donor’s 
marginal tax rate. But there is no theoretical reason why this is a 
desirable result.46 The optimal marginal reimbursement rate depends on 
several factors, such as responsiveness to tax incentives, “voice” in 
allocating federal funds for charitable purposes, and incentives in 
recruiting donors to select, fund, and monitor charitable projects. The 
choice of optimal marginal tax rates reflects a very different set of 
considerations. 
 
 41. David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information and the 
Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 Tax L. Rev. 221, 235–39 (2009).  
 42. Id.  
 43. One could keep the amount of federal funding for charitable activities constant but design a 
matching grant program that avoids several of the deficiencies of the current charitable tax deduction. 
See Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the 
Income Tax Deduction, 27 Tax L. Rev. 377, 413–14 (1971). 
 44. Charles T. Clotfelter & Lester M. Salamon, The Impact of the 1981 Tax Act on Individual 
Charitable Giving, in Economics of Nonprofit Institutions, supra note 15, at 207, 209.  
 45. Generally, only about 30% of taxpayers itemize their deductions. See generally Deena 
Ackerman & Gerald Auten, Floors, Ceilings, and Opening the Door for a Non-Itemizer Deduction, 
59 Nat’l Tax J. 509 (2006). In 2008, 33.8% of individual U.S. tax returns claimed itemized deductions. 
IRS, Pub. 4198, 2010 Tax Statistics: Statistics of Income (2010). 
 46. Daniel Shaviro, Commentary on Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions, 
Presentation at the NYU School of Law Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance (Mar. 10, 2011) 
(on file with the Author). 
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For those who value large scale charitable projects by wealthy 
individuals, the current system likely provides inadequate tax incentives 
for charitable contributions. Many of the billionaires who signed the 
Giving Pledge likely have relatively low marginal income tax rates (but 
gift and estate tax rates of 35%).47 Most of their wealth is in the form of 
unrealized capital appreciation and most of their income is tax favored, 
either in the form of tax-exempt interest or dividends, capital gains, and 
“carried interest” in investment partnerships, each of which is subject to 
a 15% tax rate.48 If we really wanted to encourage the very wealthy to be 
more charitable (particularly the young billionaires), it makes sense to 
increase the charitable subsidy by increasing the marginal reimbursement 
rate, and not tie the subsidy to their tax rate. In contrast, for those who 
are concerned that high-income taxpayers already have greater voice in 
allocating federal funds for their favored charities (charities engaged in 
educational, cultural, and medical activities) rather than charities favored 
by lower-income individuals (religious institutions and social welfare 
agencies), the marginal reimbursement rate would be the same for all 
donors, regardless of tax rate.49 
One could keep the total amount of federal funding for charitable 
activities at the same $50 billion amount, but design a matching grant 
program that has different allocation and matching criteria from the 
current system. For example, if Congress determines that $200 million of 
federal funds should be allocated to match private contributions made to 
museums, then museums could apply for matching funds based on 
criteria besides idiosyncratic donor preferences.50 
A common refrain among tax scholars is that the tax deduction for 
charitable contributions has an “upside-down” effect.51 High-bracket 
taxpayers receive greater tax benefits than low-bracket taxpayers; and 
those taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions receive no tax 
benefit at all.52 Of the estimated $35 billion in tax benefits related to 
charitable deductions in 2009, over $19.1 billion went to taxpayers with 
$200,000 or more in income and $9.1 billon went to taxpayers with 
incomes of $100,000 to $200,000.53 Concern with this upside-down effect 
 
 47. See IRS, supra note 6, at 11. 
 48. Id. at 3. 
 49. See Appendix B, infra, for information on charitable giving by households, income levels, and 
type of charity. 
 50. This approach has the advantage of being more transparent as to the level of funding for the 
activity and the identity of the beneficiaries of federal funds. Depending on the requirements to be 
eligible for matching funds, it may also reduce funds spent on nonqualifying activities. At the same 
time, this approach also has several disadvantages, including higher administrative costs and the 
potential risk of corruption and similar challenges that come with having government officials involved 
in allocating funds. 
 51. See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 43, at 383–84. 
 52. Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Returns, Stat. Income Bull., Fall 2009, at 7–14.  
 53. Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, supra note 16, at 56. A more detailed analysis is presented in 
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has led to proposals to replace the charitable deduction with a 
refundable credit.54 
While the charitable deduction certainly provides greater financial 
incentives for those in higher tax brackets, my own take is slightly 
different and highlights the tax burden of high-bracket non-donors. At a 
general level, the tax cost of charitable deductions can be viewed as 
either reducing government spending or increasing taxes; so either 
government programs are smaller for tax year 2010 by the $37 billion 
that subsidized taxpayer contribution to charity, or taxes on other 
taxpayers are higher by $37 billion (or some combination). As a group, 
the top 10% of taxpayers pay about 70% of total federal income taxes, 
and the top 50% of taxpayers pay all or mostly all of federal income 
taxes.55 So who bears the costs of subsidizing charity? If one takes the 
view that tax rates are higher because of the charitable deduction, then 
the cost of this subsidy is borne by less charitable high-income taxpayers. 
Thus, the poor are not disproportionately subsidizing the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation’s activities or the Los Angeles Opera’s $32 
million post-modern production of Richard Wagner’s Ring Cycle; it is 
the high-bracket taxpayers who are not charitably inclined who bear the 
major burden of these endeavors.56 
With the benefits of leveraging government funds to increase the 
money and expertise contributed by private actors to charitable activities 
comes the responsibility of ensuring that the private and matching 
government funds are actually used for charitable purposes. For practical 
purposes, the bar for qualifying for charitable status for both tax and 
state law purposes is remarkably low. The IRS and state governments 
share oversight of the nonprofit sector. The IRS has the authority to 
grant the initial qualification for tax-exempt status, while nonprofit status 
 
Appendix B, infra, using data from Center on Philanthropy at Ind. U., Patterns of Household 
Charitable Giving by Income Group, 2005, at 12 (2007).  
 54. See William Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation 131 (1947); Lily L. Batchelder et 
al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 52–53 
(2006); Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 Tax Law. 549, 555–57 (2007). The choice between 
a credit and a deduction for charitable contributions depends on both equity and efficiency 
considerations, as well as on one’s view of the purpose of the charitable deduction. If the purpose is to 
correct failures in the political process, the credit approach has great appeal as the deduction both 
disenfranchises lower-income individuals and gives higher-income individuals disproportionate power 
over the direction of federal funds. If the purpose is to correct market failures in underprovided public 
goods, a deduction approach may yield more “bang for the buck,” assuming high-income donors are 
more responsive to tax incentives than are low-income donors. 
 55. The Tax Policy Center estimates that 46% of American households will owe no income tax in 
2011. Rachel Johnson et al., Tax Pol’y Center, Why Some Tax Units Pay No Income Tax 1 (July 
2011).  
 56. This may be another factor in why the current tax regime for charitable contributions is part 
of a political bargain that is acceptable to low-income and middle-income groups. See Jeff Strand, The 
Charitable Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis, in Economics of Nonprofit Institutions, supra 
note 15, at 265–68. 
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is determined under state corporate law.57 The IRS receives more than 
50,000 applications for tax-exempt status each year and approves 
virtually all of them.58 As long as the organization complies with the rules 
against private inurement, private benefit, and political activity, the IRS 
will generally grant tax-exempt status to any organization that has a 
plausible charitable purpose, broadly defined.59 
There are mandatory disclosure requirements for charities with 
annual gross receipts over $25,000.60 The IRS has revised the tax return 
form applicable to tax-exempt organizations (Form 990) to include more 
questions related to governance and has published best-practice 
governance guidelines.61 While the IRS has the authority to terminate 
tax-exempt status for violating the prohibitions against private benefits62 
or certain public policy provisions,63 the IRS has few sanctions for less 
serious violations.64 
In response to some abuses concerning charities controlled by a 
small group of donors, Congress has imposed additional limitations for 
those charities where donors and control are highly concentrated, known 
as private foundations. The tax law provides for several excise taxes that 
apply to self-dealing and other transactions between insiders and the 
private foundation.65 Private foundations are also required to make 
“qualifying distributions” to charitable activities each year equal to 5% 
of their net assets.66 Private foundations cannot treat grants to foreign 
 
 57. Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 139, 146–47 (2007). 
 58. In 2008, the IRS approved about 98% of all applications. Rob Reich, Lacey Dorn & Stefanie 
Sutton, Stan. U. Ctr. on Philanthropy & Civ. Soc’y, Anything Goes: Approval of Nonprofit 
Status by the I.R.S. 7–11 (2009). 
 59. Reich, Dorn, and Sutton have demonstrated how little the IRS exercises any substantive 
oversight by listing the twenty most eccentric public charities approved by the IRS in 2008. Id. at 17–
24. These organizations include the All Colorado Beer Festival, Curtains Without Borders, the 
International Society of Talking Clock Collectors, and the Gateway Sisters of Perpetual Indulgences 
(nuns from the leather community). Id. 
 60. Organizations with annual gross receipts of less than $25,000 ($50,000 for tax years ending on 
or after December 31, 2010) are required to file Form-990-N, also known as the e-postcard. This form 
requires only very basic information about the charitable organization. 
 61. See generally Tax Analysts, IRS Releases Final 2008 Form 990 for Tax-Exempt Organizations, 
2007 Tax Notes Today 246-16. 
 62. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 7805(b)(8) (2010); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-(c)(2), 301.7805-1(b) (2010). 
 63. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 579 (1983) (upholding the IRS’s 
revocation of tax-exempt status for violating the established public policy of discouraging 
discrimination in education).  
 64. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Philanthropy in the 21st Century: An 
Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 479, 526 (2009). 
 65. The IRS regulates private foundations through a series of excise tax provisions set forth in 
sections 4940–4946. These include taxes on failure to satisfy minimum distribution obligations, 
sanctions on excess business holdings, sanctions on jeopardizing investments, and sanctions on 
“taxable expenditures” (grants where private foundations fail to exercise expenditure responsibility or 
fail to make a good faith determination that the recipient organization is equivalent to a section 
509(a)(1), (2), or (3) organization). 
 66. I.R.C. § 4942(g) (2010). 
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charities as part of the qualifying distributions unless they can establish 
that the foreign grantee has either obtained an exemption ruling from 
the IRS or the private foundation has made a good faith determination 
that the foreign grantee is equivalent to a U.S. public charity.67 Private 
foundations are also subject to excise taxes for certain “taxable 
expenditures,” which include amounts contributed to foreign grantees 
unless either the private foundation can establish that the recipient is 
equivalent to a public charity or that it exercises expenditure 
responsibility.68 
Finally, nonprofits are also subject to state government regulation. 
Qualifying under state nonprofit law is generally even easier than gaining 
federal tax-exempt status.69 In most states, founders simply file a 
certificate of incorporation and a copy of the bylaws with the state 
agency and pay a de minimis fee.70 Although the state attorney general 
has oversight of the activities of charitable organizations organized and 
operated in the state, the general consensus is that there has been 
inadequate state supervision of charitable activities, particularly with 
regard to enforcing the fiduciary duties of officers, directors, and 
trustees.71 Dissatisfaction with governance of nonprofits has led to 
various proposals for greater federal or state oversight.72 These proposals 
include a new federal oversight agency or new state-level agencies or 
commissions.73 In addition, there are proposals for additional monitoring 
by the private sector through either a private regulatory body with 
oversight of certain charities or increased opportunities for individuals to 
bring suits challenging improper activities of officers and directors of 
nonprofit organizations.74 
 
 67. See Kimberly S. Blanchard, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Charities, 8 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 719, 
723 (1993).  
 68. I.R.C. § 4945(d) (2010). Expenditure responsibility requires (1) a pre-grant inquiry that the 
grantee will make reasonable use of funds; (2) a written agreement between the grantor and grantee; 
(3) that the grantee will keep funds in a separate account; (4) that the grantee will report in writing 
one year after the grant how the funds were used; and (5) that the grantor will report to the IRS how 
the funds were used. John A. Edie, Expenditure Responsibility: Step By Step 9 (2002). 
 69. Horwitz, supra note 57, at 147. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 
73 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 434–37 (1960). 
 72. See Mayer & Wilson, supra note 64, at 501–04. 
 73. Id. at 495–501. Commentators have also called for stronger internal controls for nonprofits. 
See Christine Petrovits et al., The Causes and Consequences of Internal Control Problems in Nonprofit 
Organizations, 86 Acct. Rev. 325, 329 (2011). 
 74. See Mayer & Wilson, supra note 64, at 501–04; see also Karst, supra note 71, at 445–49. 
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II.  Should Tax Benefits Support Charitable Activities 
Outside the United States? 
With some exceptions and restrictions, current law allows 
individuals and corporations to deduct contributions made to U.S. 
charities, even if most or all of the funds are used to support foreign 
charitable activities.75 Should tax law privilege domestic charitable 
activities over foreign charitable activities? 
A. General Considerations 
To some readers, this may appear to be a relatively easy question: 
we should allow tax subsidies for charitable activities outside the U.S. 
We are rich; they are poor.76 For a wealthy country, there is a moral 
obligation to provide financial and other support for famine and poverty 
relief.77 And even from a purely selfish perspective, the negative 
externalities attributable to environmental pollutants, infectious diseases, 
and destructive ideologies would support subsidizing charitable activities 
outside the U.S. to minimize domestic consequences.78 
Over the last twenty years, there has been a substantial shift from 
official development assistance by governments and international 
institutions to private philanthropy and remittances.79 Foreign charitable 
assistance has increased dramatically both from U.S. entities with foreign 
charitable activities and from the growth of the charitable sector in both 
developed and developing countries.80 Domestic private foundations and 
public charities can generally use funds received from U.S. donors to 
support foreign charitable activities, but individuals generally cannot 
receive tax deductions for contributions made directly to foreign 
charities.81 Although tax benefits for foreign charitable activities 
supported by U.S. taxpayers are still limited, in 2007 U.S. entities 
provided about $40 billion for foreign charitable activities, while U.S. 
governmental assistance (aside from tax benefits) totaled only $21.8 
billion.82 If the relatively thin popular support for the U.S. government’s 
 
 75. See Pozen, supra note 10, at 540–42; see also Dale, supra note 18, at 659–62.  
 76. About half of the world’s population (about 3 billion people) lives on less than $2.50 a day. 
The mortality rate for children under five is fifteen times higher in low-income countries than in high-
income countries. Unicef, Levels & Trends in Child Mortality 18 (2011). 
 77. Moral philosophers, such as Peter Singer, make a compelling case for the “cosmopolitan” 
responsibilities of those in affluent countries to help those in countries with extreme poverty. See 
generally Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty (2009). 
 78. Pozen, supra note 10, at 580. 
 79. See Heidi Metcalf Little, The Role of Private Assistance in International Development, 
42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1091, 1091–93 (2010). 
 80. Hudson Inst. Center for Global Prosperity, The Index of Global Philanthropy and 
Remittances 15 (2009); Little, supra note 79, at 1091–93. 
 81. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (2010). 
 82. Support came from private foundations ($5.4 billion), private and voluntary organizations 
($14.3 billion), religious organizations ($8.6 billion), corporations ($6.8 billion), and colleges and 
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provision of foreign aid is a good indication of preferences for the 
geographic focus of government expenditures, then perhaps the public 
favors preferential tax treatment for domestic charitable activities over 
foreign activities.83 The tax law in other countries varies greatly, as some 
countries require all donated funds to be used within the home country 
and other countries impose no geographic limitations on the use of 
funds.84 
U.S. charitable organizations have a long tradition of overseas 
assistance, mostly rooted in missionary efforts in Africa, Asia, and South 
America.85 Putting aside for a moment the difficult line-drawing 
questions of religious and humanitarian activity, using government funds 
to support these efforts raises many difficult questions. Current foreign 
assistance efforts are also problematic. The Gates Foundation spent 
$2.5 billion in 2009 to support its charitable efforts outside the U.S., 
including its efforts to combat malaria in Africa.86 In addition to the 
roughly $2–3 billion in annual economic and military aid that Israel 
receives through direct assistance from the U.S. government, U.S. 
individuals make hundreds of millions of dollars in tax-deductible 
charitable contributions to U.S. charities that fund activities in Israel, 
including a reported $33 million in tax-deductible contributions to fund 
the building of settlements in disputed territories.87 Finally, I suspect, but 
do not know, that matching government dollars are likely funding both 
sides of the conflict regarding the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in Uganda, 
with participation by both American evangelical churches and by human 
and gay rights groups funded by tax-deductible charitable contributions.88 
 
universities ($3.9 billion). IRS, Advisory Comm. on Tax Exempt & Gov’t Entities, Pub. 4344, Exempt 
Organizations: Recommendations to Improve the Tax Rules Governing International Grant 
Making 3 (2009).  
 83. For example, in 2002, only 45% of the U.S. population was in favor of increasing foreign 
financial aid. This was much lower than in other countries such as the United Kingdom (69%), Canada 
(64%), Australia (63%), or Germany (68%). The only country in a similar range to the U.S. is Japan, 
which also has only 45% of the population’s support for an increase in foreign aid. Pamela Paxton & 
Stephen Knack, Individual and Country-Level Factors Affecting Support for Foreign-Aid 27 (World 
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4714, 2008). 
 84. Brazil, Russia, and Thailand condition tax deductibility on use of funds within the country, 
while Italy, Poland, and South Africa allow charitable tax deductions without regard for where the 
funds are used. See Pozen, supra note 10, at 546 n.67. See generally Lester M. Salamon, The 
International Guide to Nonprofit Law (1997). 
 85. Appendix C, infra, provides a relatively current distribution of U.S. nonprofit international 
assistance efforts by region. 
 86. Bill & Melinda Gates Found., 2009 Annual Report 12 (2009). 
 87. Hillel Schmid & Avishag Rudich, Social Entrepreneurship and the Israeli Reality, 
International Conference, The Implications of the Decline in Philanthropy on Israeli 
Nonprofit Organizations and Social Services 5 (2008); David Ignatius, A Tax Break Fuels Middle 
East Friction, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 2009, at A21. 
 88. See Warren Throckmorton, A U.S. Church and Its “Kill the Gays” Partner in Uganda, Salon.com 
(July 2, 2010, 4:01 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2010/07/02/church_uganda_gays_bill. 
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Should the Gates Foundation decide which diseases and which 
African countries merit matching funds? Should a relatively small group 
of donors influence the flow of matching dollars to Israel rather than 
much poorer, and, by some measures, needier developing countries? 
And should government funds support either side of the Ugandan anti-
homosexuality debate? 
In his blog, Judge Richard Posner raised the question of whether 
Americans should get tax deductions for gifts to domestic charities that 
donate or operate abroad.89 Judge Posner argues against allowing such 
deductions.90 His opposition does not rest on the grounds that U.S. 
government foreign aid projects are more efficient than private activities. 
Nor does he challenge a traditional rationale for all charitable 
deductions: that the external benefits associated with charitable giving 
and the tendency of rational individuals to free ride on the charitable 
efforts of others results in the underprovision of certain goods and 
services. 
Judge Posner puts forth three major grounds for denying charitable 
deductions for foreign activities: (1) He believes that denying deductions 
for foreign charitable activities will increase funds available for domestic 
charitable activities (the “substitution effect”),91 (2) he believes that 
denying deductions for foreign charitable activities will reduce the 
overall level of charitable contributions so that the tax subsidy for 
charitable contributions will decrease, and overall tax revenues will 
increase (the “revenue effect”),92 and (3) he suspects that giving to poor 
people in the U.S. may create greater utility as compared to giving to 
poor people in developing countries—as foreign donations reduce the 
pressure for desperately needed political, economic, and social reforms 
(the “Mugabe effect”).93 
As a blog post, this explanation likely just reflects Judge Posner’s 
initial reactions to the question of the relative merits of domestic and 
foreign charities. Nonetheless, the post is a good overview of the general 
considerations at work, and it is useful to unpack some of the reasoning 
behind Judge Posner’s intuition. There are several possible reasons to 
favor substitution away from foreign activities and toward domestic 
activities. First, one could value the direct assistance to domestic 
recipients more than transfers to foreign beneficiaries. There is a strong 
 
 89. Richard Posner, Tax Deductions for American Charitable Donations Abroad, Becker-Posner 
Blog (Mar. 15, 2009, 5:29 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2009/03/tax-deductions-for-american-
charitable-donations-abroad--posner.html. Economist Gary Becker responded in the same post that 
opposition to deductions for donations to foreign charities was just a cover for protectionism, in this 
case protecting domestic charitable organizations from competition with foreign organizations. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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intuitive appeal to helping those closer to us (both geographically and 
culturally) than those outside our borders. Second, if we focus only on 
the overall welfare of our society (defined by national borders), then it is 
likely that more of the externalities generated by domestic charitable 
activities will remain in our country. Finally, if we view part of the 
bargain of providing tax benefits for charitable contributions as relieving 
government of the obligation of providing the goods and services 
directly, then favoring domestic activities over foreign activities may 
reduce the demand for domestic government spending. Each of these 
reasons would support a regime that privileged charitable assistance to 
victims of Hurricane Katrina over charitable assistance to victims of the 
Japanese earthquake and tsunami. 
All of these arguments are subject to strong counterclaims. It is hard 
to make comparisons between deserving individual recipients in the U.S. 
and abroad. Questions as to who are the more deserving beneficiaries 
raise difficult value judgments that are hard to evaluate without some 
normative framework. And it is difficult to take such a narrow view of 
society in measuring general welfare, especially given the international 
consequences of many local challenges. Finally, foreign charitable 
activities may well result in less direct U.S. government assistance to 
foreign countries. 
Giving preference to domestic, rather than foreign, altruism for 
revenue reasons is also not clear-cut. If the goal is to limit the revenue 
cost from charitable contributions, there are probably several 
alternatives that could reduce the lost revenue, some with relatively little 
effect on charitable giving. For example, there have been several 
proposals to provide for charitable deductions only for those 
contributions in excess of 1% or 2% of adjusted gross income.94 If the 
revenue cost from charitable contributions is considered too large, it is 
not obvious without some normative framework that the place to start 
chopping is support for foreign charitable activities. The U.S. generally 
provides the same tax benefits to all types of charitable activities, even 
though one could imagine a regime where certain activities that generate 
higher levels of societal benefits (through greater externalities) receive 
greater tax benefits than activities where most of the benefits are 
captured by those making the contributions. 
Finally, a blanket prohibition on tax benefits for deductions for all 
foreign charitable activities because of Mugabe and Mugabe-lite 
circumstances makes little sense. It is a big hammer, and it may hit the 
downtrodden people as much or more than the repressive regime. 
 
 94. One recent proposal would allow itemizers to deduct the amount of their charitable donations 
in excess of 2% of their adjusted gross income. Cong. Budget Off., supra note 26, at 9–11.  
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My objective here is not so much to question Judge Posner’s 
intuition about the relative merits of domestic versus foreign altruism, 
but rather to highlight some of the challenges in trying to frame the 
theoretical and policy issues in deciding whether, how, and how much to 
use the tax system to subsidize any charitable activity and whether to 
favor charitable activities in the U.S., as compared to charitable activities 
outside our borders. The decision to provide a tax subsidy for 
contributions to domestic charities for charitable activities in the U.S. 
does not rest on a simple, comprehensive theory but rather a set of trade-
offs that balance the costs and benefits of using tax dollars to subsidize 
domestic charitable activities. It is not clear that the same set of trade-
offs would apply in the foreign context or that policymakers need adopt 
the same tax regime for charitable contributions for foreign activities. 
B. Tax Scholarship 
Tax scholars have taken different approaches in examining the 
justifications for tax benefits for charitable activities. With respect to tax 
deductibility of charitable contributions, the literature falls into two 
general categories. One group of scholars focuses primarily on the donor. 
They justify allowing tax deductions for charitable contributions based 
on considerations of designing the proper base for taxation and income 
measurement. A mostly different group of scholars justifies tax benefits 
for charitable deductions as a subsidy for collective goods and services. 
The difference is important. The donor-based theories are rooted in the 
design of a tax system. In contrast, the subsidy-based theories seek to use 
the tax system as a means to achieve non-tax objectives, in this case 
increasing incentives for private donors to support and monitor 
charitable activities and providing matching funds to supplement their 
efforts. 
1. Donor-Oriented Approaches 
Early examinations of the role of charitable deductions in an ideal 
tax system worked within the Haig-Simons framework, which defines 
income as the sum of personal consumption (“private preclusive use”) 
plus wealth accumulation over a given time period.95 Considering this 
definition of income, amounts transferred as charitable contributions are 
not income to the donor because they do not result in exclusive personal 
consumption. Instead, such contributions create common goods whose 
enjoyment is not confined to contributors, nor apportioned among 
contributors according to amounts of contributions.96 In contrast to other 
 
 95. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 313, 
320–21 (1972). 
 96. Id. at 346.  
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approaches, under the donor-oriented approach there is no effective 
government subsidy for charitable contributions, as such amounts are not 
considered income in the first place. 
Alternatively, but still considering the perspective of the donor, a 
charitable deduction should be allowed because it equitably accounts for 
loss of welfare by the donor.97 Society should reward those who transfer 
private resources for the public good. In addition, as donations often 
derive from perceived moral obligations, the involuntary nature of the 
transfer should not require the donor to be taxed on such amounts. 
Serious challenges have been offered to both of these donor-
oriented approaches.98 What is striking is how relatively poorly these 
theories have held up over time. While they reflect a common intuition 
that money (or other property) transferred to charity should qualify for 
income tax deductions, the theoretical basis for charitable deductions as 
a way of accurately measuring income remains shaky. 
These donor-focused theories provide little guidance as to what 
types of charitable activities warrant support or whether giving for 
domestic activities should be preferred over giving for foreign charitable 
activities. As long as the donor gives up control of the property, it does 
not matter how or where the donated resources are actually used. These 
theories justify the tax deduction because donors are worse off as a result 
of their charitable donations. To the extent that geographic distance 
between the donor and the beneficiaries makes it harder for a donor to 
achieve reputational, social, or financial advantages from donations, an 
argument could be made that the donor-centric theories favor giving to 
foreign charitable activity over domestic activity.99 However, in the age of 
Bono and Angelina Jolie, for many donors it may be more chic to give 
globally rather than locally, so physical distance may no longer serve to 
separate donors from the direct or indirect (psychological) benefits of the 
donations. 
2. Subsidy-Oriented Approaches 
A second common approach is to justify the charitable deduction 
(and other tax benefits) as a subsidy for certain types of underprovided 
collective goods and services. There are several strands of the subsidy 
literature, focusing on different types of market failure or government 
failure. The market failure arguments generally start with examination of 
 
 97. Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 Tax L. 
Rev. 37, 46–49 (1972). 
 98. See generally Gergen, supra note 14 (concluding that the loss-of-welfare theory is valid, but 
subject to significant constraints); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit 
Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 
831 (1979) (discounting true altruism). 
 99. Pozen, supra note 10, at 573. 
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public goods—those goods where one person’s consumption does not 
reduce availability to others (“nonrival”) and there is no way to exclude 
others from enjoying the good (“nonexclusive”).100 Such goods will be 
undersupplied because self-interested individuals will choose to free ride 
on the charitable activities of others rather than pay to support the goods 
and services themselves.101 As a practical matter, most goods provided by 
governments are rival and excludable. These goods and services include 
schools, hospitals, roads, and various transfer payments.102 But these 
goods and services can generate externalities that are not fully captured 
by market participants.103 There is thus a role for charities (and 
governments) to supply such goods where there are substantial secondary 
benefits. 
Some types of goods and services provide elements of public goods 
and private assistance. For example, disaster relief for hurricane and 
earthquake victims is an example of pure public goods if one focuses on 
the benefits that accrue to society generally rather than the specific 
private assistance given to the individuals or the specific pleasures donors 
receive from making the contributions.104 Donors to charitable relief 
efforts get the satisfaction of seeing their dollars help relieve the 
suffering caused by natural disasters. But non-donors also get 
psychological benefits from seeing a reduction in suffering. They can free 
ride off the generosity of others. Allowing a tax deduction for charitable 
contributions thus both increases the amount of funds going to these 
types of relief efforts (correcting a suboptimal level of funding) and 
imposes costs on those uncharitable individuals (making them 
involuntary contributors to these causes). 
Support for tax subsidies for charitable contributions also rests on 
potential failures that may be inherent in the government decisionmaking 
process. If we leave all spending decisions to the political process, the 
level of collective goods and services would be decided by majority rule. 
The tax subsidy for charitable contributions allows, at least for certain 
types of goods and services, the preferences of a minority of voters who 
have a greater taste for certain collective activities to receive government 
support, as long as they are willing also to pay for them.105 This 
decentralized approach allows for greater diversity, innovation, and other 
benefits.106 Under this view, the greater the heterogeneity of preferences 
 
 100. See Gergen, supra note 14, at 1397; see also Robin W. Boadway & David E. Wildasin, Public 
Sector Economics 57–60 (2d ed. 1984). 
 101. Gergen, supra note 14, at 1398.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. Market failures could also result from other causes, such as information asymmetries.  
 104. Id. at 1397–98. 
 105. Levmore, supra note 15, at 405–06. 
 106. Id. at 408–12. 
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for collective goods, the stronger the case for tax subsidies for charitable 
contributions. 
But who should decide which types of goods are underprovided by 
either the government or the market? Under the current regime of 
matching charitable contributions, individual donors can direct 
government spending while bypassing majority approval. Minority 
preferences dictate government spending patterns.107 This tax regime 
allows Harvard, NYU, Yale, and UCLA to receive the lion’s share of 
matching tax dollars directed for higher education (rather than 
community colleges or historically black colleges)108 and results in the 
U.S. government providing greater financial subsidies to charities in 
Israel than to charities in poor developing countries.109 It may be that 
donors got it exactly right in allocating the federal funds to deserving 
educational institutions and deserving foreign countries in a way that 
reflects popular preferences and maximizes social returns,110 but I doubt 
it. The harder question is whether they, as a group, can do a better job 
than Congress, the Departments of Education or State, some band of 
experts, or a matching grant program that allocated funds based on 
different criteria than the current tax regime. For our purposes, it is 
remarkable how little guidance these subsidy theories provide on such 
basic questions as which types of activities should qualify for favorable 
tax treatment and whether to extend tax deductions for foreign 
charitable activities. While the subsidy theories may provide general 
support for the government matching of private contributions, they do 
not tell us what types of activities to support, how much, or in which 
countries. Attempts to rank charities as to their relative worthiness based 
on purpose and effectiveness of performance face substantial obstacles.111 
This is perhaps unsurprising given both the difficulty of achieving 
political consensus on those activities that are more or less worthy and of 
assessing the relative efficiency and effectiveness of performance. 
Part of the challenge in thinking about tax subsidies for charities is 
the sheer number of and diversity within charitable organizations. In 
2009 there were approximately 1.6 million nonprofit organizations, 
including almost 400,000 religious congregations, which are not required 
 
 107. Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 Ind. L.J. 1047, 1063 
(2009); Ray D. Madoff, What Leona Helmsley Can Teach Us About the Charitable Deduction, 85 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 957, 966 (2010). 
 108. In a 2010 survey, the top twenty colleges and universities represented about 2% of the total 
number of institutions but received about 25.5% of all 2010 gifts to higher education institutions. 
Council for Aid to Educ., Colleges and Universities Raise $28 Billion in 2010, at 2 (2011). 
 109. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 110. This need not be due to donors having preferences different from the socially optimal 
distribution. An inefficient distribution of charitable giving would likely occur simply from 
information asymmetries.  
 111. See generally Schmalbeck, supra note 32. 
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to file with the IRS.112 In terms of spending, health service organizations 
account for 59% of total nonprofit spending, with educational 
organizations accounting for an additional 17%.113 In terms of tax 
subsidies, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that for 2010, 
charitable deductions for educational institutions will result in tax 
expenditures of $5.5 billion, for health organizations will result in tax 
expenditures of $4.3 billion, and for charitable organizations other than 
education and health, including religious organizations, will result in tax 
expenditures of $30.2 billion.114 Charitable organizations also vary greatly 
in the proportion of revenues that comes from fees for services rather 
than donations and grants.115 
One’s enthusiasm for using tax subsidies for charitable contributions 
is likely influenced by both the ability of the IRS and states’ attorneys 
general to monitor the activities of the charities and by how effective 
federal funds are in increasing the level of underprovided goods and 
services. The apparent unwillingness of the IRS to provide meaningful 
review of applications for tax-exempt status and the difficulty for both 
the IRS and state officials of monitoring effectively the large number of 
charities under their supervision undermine our confidence that a 
significant amount of donors’ funds and federal matching funds are being 
well spent on charitable activities, or at least that they could not be better 
spent by other charitable organizations. Even where there is no improper 
use of funds, there may be a mismatch between theories supporting tax 
subsidies and the types of charities receiving those subsidies. 
A strong case can be made for subsidizing charities providing 
disaster relief and social welfare services because of market failures in 
the level of services that would exist without government intervention. 
This fits nicely with a “plain-meaning” and historical view of charity.116 
The case for subsidization of many other types of charities under market 
failure theories is much weaker.117 Operas, museums, and private schools 
 
 112. Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1999–2009, Nat’l Ctr. for 
Charitable Stat., http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profile1.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
Classifying a nonprofit as “religious” is difficult due to IRS reporting requirements. 
 113. James R. Hines, Jr., et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 
108 Mich. L. Rev. 1179, 1185 (2010). 
 114. Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, 111th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for 
Fiscal Years 2010–2014, tbl.1, at 43–48 (Comm. Print 2010) (including corporate and individual 
deductions). 
 115. Dennis R. Young, Nonprofit Revenue Streams: Finding the Right Mix, Mandel Ctr. for 
Nonprofit Orgs. 9–10 (May 20, 2004), http://www.nationalcne.org/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
feature.display&feature_id=81.  
 116. Charity is the “voluntary giving of help, typically in the form of money, to those in need.” The 
New Oxford American Dictionary 288 (2001).  
 117. In the domestic context, Mark Gergen is one of the few scholars to examine specific activities 
under different justifications for tax subsidies. He finds that contributions to social welfare agencies 
are supported on both subsidy and equity grounds. Other types of charitable activities do not fare as 
well under the Gergen approach. Contributions to public television fail to satisfy either the subsidy or 
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are examples of what may be called “club goods”—goods that can be 
fenced and made available only to members.118 The case for subsidies to 
these entities is much less compelling. While these organizations produce 
some spillover benefits to society at large, most of the benefits are 
enjoyed by their members. 
Historically, churches were one of the primary providers of 
assistance to the poor, ill, and helpless.119 They provide an effective 
collective mechanism for matching donors to needy beneficiaries. Today, 
however, some scholars contend that only a small percentage of funds 
(approximately 12%)120 go to charitable activities for the poor, with the 
vast majority (70–80%) going to property improvement or operating 
expenses, such as salaries that benefit church members primarily.121 
While churches generate benefits to the community and to society, even 
putting aside issues of using government funds to support religious 
activity, it is not clear that this justifies full deductibility of contributions 
to religious organizations. 
These subsidy theories often seem to support extension of the 
charitable deduction to foreign charitable activities.122 For example, if the 
rationale for tax subsidies for charitable contributions rests on 
government or market failures, then those societies with great failures 
may benefit the most from receiving charitable assistance. Law and 
development scholars generally contend that governments (and other 
providers) may have a greater role to play where markets function 
poorly.123 Particularly for low-income and middle-income countries, the 
size of government is correlated with per capita income, and many 
developing countries lack resources to provide for certain basic collective 
goods and services.124 But while there is a clear need for assistance in 
many low-income and middle-income foreign countries, it is not clear 
who should provide the assistance and what the form the assistance 
should take. 
 
equity theory, while church-related expenditures do well under an equity theory but poorly under a 
subsidy theory. Gergen, supra note 14, at 1433–49. 
 118. Id.; Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System 9 (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. 
Law Research Paper No. 394, Bus. & Econ. Paper No. 09-25 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473107.  
 119. See generally Robert A. Gross, Giving in America: From Charity to Philanthropy, in Charity, 
Philanthropy, and Civility in American History 29 (Lawrence J. Friedman & Mark D. McGarvie 
eds., 2003) (discussing Christian charity’s early charitable purposes in America). 
 120. Susan K. E. Saxon-Harrold et al., America’s Religious Congregations: Measuring Their 
Contribution to Society 5 (2000) (using 1996 survey data). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Pozen, supra note 10, at 574–87. Appendix D, infra, provides information about the types of 
foreign charitable activities supported by U.S. nonprofit organizations. 
 123. Robin Burgess & Nicholas Stern, Taxation and Development, 31 J. of Econ. Literature 762, 
764–66 (1993). 
 124. In many countries, however, simply providing additional funds to governments may not be a 
good approach. Where government is inefficient and corrupt, smaller governments may be better. 
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Mitchell Kane offers an interesting example that nicely highlights 
some of these issues.125 Assume the U.S. and another country are 
identical in every respect, including a currently underprovided public 
good and the same absolute levels of individual utilities in both 
countries.126 Assume also the benefits of the externalities from the public 
good are enjoyed entirely locally.127 Should the U.S. tax its individual and 
corporate taxpayers to provide the same level of public goods in both 
countries?128 
As a matter of domestic tax policy, Kane argues that the answer is 
clearly no.129 Despite calls by moral philosophers advocating greater 
cosmopolitan responsibilities, tax and spending policies in the U.S. are 
driven by the gains to its citizens and residents rather than to foreign 
beneficiaries.130 We give greater weight to the utilities of our citizens and 
residents and discount the utilities of foreigners.131 If we cannot justify 
using general tax revenue to fund foreign charitable activities, we should 
not use the charitable deduction as a means of providing public goods 
outside the U.S. Kane thus finds a strong case for preferring tax benefits 
for domestic rather than foreign charitable activities.132 Following this 
logic, our tax system should give preference to donations made to 
Harvard and the Metropolitan Opera over donations made to Oxford 
University and the Royal Opera House. 
Relaxing some of the assumptions of Kane’s example muddies the 
water. Consider charitable transfers from U.S. donors to a U.S. charity 
that provides support for victims of the Japanese earthquake and 
tsunami. These transfers provide utility both to the foreign recipients of 
the assistance and to the U.S. donors (and perhaps other U.S. individuals 
who appreciate both the willingness of others to donate for these causes 
and the use of matching federal funds for this particular purpose). It is 
not clear that our tax system should prefer donations made to the 
Metropolitan Opera over donations made to charities that help those less 
fortunate, even if the direct beneficiaries are outside the U.S. 
Changing the focus from subsidies based on market failure to 
subsidies based on political failure helps little in deciding whether the 
charitable deduction should be extended to foreign charitable activities. 
It is not clear that the same considerations that may support allowing 
donors to decide in the domestic context apply with the same force for 
foreign charitable activity. Again, these theories are based on the notion 
 
 125. Kane, supra note 39. 
 126. Id. at 4.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
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that private charity responds better to differences in demand for 
collective goods than does the government. This assumes broad 
participation by a large group of donors supporting many different types 
of activities. But it seems likely that allowing a charitable deduction for 
contributions for foreign activities would concentrate disproportionate 
influence among certain groups, such as supporters of Mormon 
missionary activities, supporters of Israeli causes, and a handful of 
wealthy donors. 
Even if we decide as a matter of tax policy that the charitable 
deduction should not be extended to foreign charitable activities, this 
does not mean that there is no role for the government’s use of tax 
benefits to support foreign charitable activities.133 Assume, for example, 
that the U.S. government decides to provide $10 billion in funding in 
2011 for humanitarian aid to Africa. We could choose to provide the $10 
billion directly through direct foreign assistance funded out of general 
tax revenue, or allow charitable deductions at a revenue cost of $10 
billion to subsidize private assistance efforts in Africa. The question then 
becomes which alternative (or combination of the two) yields the 
greatest benefit—both in terms of choice of projects and the quality of 
the outputs. For certain types of activities and projects, private providers 
may have clear advantages over direct government foreign assistance.134 
Providing additional funds to the Gates Foundation’s efforts to combat 
malaria in Africa may be more productive than providing financial 
assistance to African governments to fund government-operated health 
facilities or to projects selected and monitored by the U.S. government. 
The existing charitable subsidy literature also fails to address several 
issues that arise in cross-border philanthropy. For example, the leading 
theory of government failure ties inadequate levels of collective goods 
and services to the preferences of the majority trumping those interested 
minorities with money to contribute.135 This theory assumes a single 
society in which the voting, contributions, and subsidies take place.136 
Once charitable activities cross borders, the interests of other groups 
should be part of the analysis. We sometimes assume that the recipients 
of charity value whatever they receive and, if they do not want it, they 
can simply turn it down. 
But it often does not work that way. With charitable assistance 
comes economic, social, and political influence. The Saudi Arabian 
government has made contributions to the William J. Clinton 
Foundation (as have the governments of Italy, Kuwait, Norway, and 
 
 133. Id. at 5. 
 134. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text. 
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Qatar),137 the CITGO-Venezuela Heating Oil Program has donated 
millions of gallons of crude oil to a U.S. charity that provides assistance 
to needy homeowners,138 and a charity that may be linked to the Iranian 
government donated $100,000 to Columbia University in advance of 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech in September 2007.139 While 
the flow of charitable contributions into the U.S. is just a trickle, donor-
provided assistance constitutes a large portion of many economies in 
developing countries. Theories that simply look at the preferences of the 
donors and the level of government subsidies, but not the preferences of 
the recipients, likely will not be useful in examining issues related to 
foreign charitable activities. 
Similarly, U.S. scholars have generally adopted a U.S.-centric view 
of government, the private sector, and the nonprofit sector. In this 
relatively simple world, existing subsidy theories reflect that the goods 
and services could be provided by any of these three actors. In 
developing countries, the cast of characters is much larger. They include 
such other players as multilateral institutions, foreign governments, 
bilateral aid agencies, and foreign charities. Each has relative advantages 
and disadvantages in providing development assistance. Again, richer 
theories are required to incorporate the complexities of different 
providers of assistance in determining the usefulness of tax subsidies for 
charitable contributions for foreign activities. 
Where does this leave us? We do not have a comprehensive theory 
that supports the automatic extension of the existing charitable-
deduction regime for contributions to fund the domestic activities of 
domestic charities to cover contributions to fund foreign charitable 
activities. Merely showing that several of the existing theories provide no 
clear basis for distinguishing between domestic and foreign charitable 
activities is not sufficient to justify adopting a geographically neutral 
policy. If we adopt the “take it or leave it” approach to the charitable 
deduction, then we need to show that the trade-offs that balance the 
costs and benefits of using tax dollars to subsidize domestic altruism 
would result in a similar determination for foreign altruism—even 
recognizing that the specific trade-offs in the domestic context will be 
different in the foreign context. The “bang for the buck” approach would 
perhaps support tax subsidies for foreign charitable activities, though not 
necessarily in the same form that applies to purely domestic activities. 
 
 137. Philip Rucker, The Near, Far, Left—Even Right—Aided Clinton Group, Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 
2010, at A2; Foreigners Gave Millions to Clinton Foundation, msnbc.com (Dec. 18, 2008), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28295539#.  
 138. For a description of the program, see Program Overview, CITGO-Venezuela Heating Oil 
Program, http://www.citgoheatingoil.com/program_overview.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 139. A.G. Sulzberger, Foundation Tied to Iran Has Donated to Columbia, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 
2009, at A30. 
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There are several alternatives for differentiating between domestic 
and foreign charitable activities. At one extreme, we could disallow 
charitable deductions for amounts spent on foreign charitable activities. 
Less severe restrictions include per-country limitations or allowing only a 
certain percentage of amounts allocated to foreign charitable activities to 
qualify for tax benefits. Finally, we could impose more restrictive 
provisions as to the type of foreign activities that qualify for tax benefits, 
recognizing that some activities provide benefits to a narrow group of 
beneficiaries (support for the Royal Opera House in England) as 
compared to a broader group of beneficiaries (support for disaster relief 
efforts). 
III.  Should the Tax System Treat Foreign Charities 
Differently from Domestic Charities? 
If the decision is made to allow tax subsidies for foreign charitable 
activities, then the question becomes which charities should provide such 
goods and services. Should the tax law provide different tax treatment 
based on the charity’s place of organization? While my focus here is on 
the tax deductibility of charitable contributions to foreign and domestic 
charities, the U.S. tax regime provides several other provisions that 
disadvantage funding of foreign, as compared to domestic, charitable 
activities.140 
A. General Considerations 
With limited exceptions, the tax law adopts a “water’s-edge” policy 
by allowing donors to deduct for income tax purposes only contributions 
made to donees “created or organized in the United States or in any 
possession thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the 
District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States.”141 
The income tax regime initially allowed tax deductions for 
contributions made to foreign charities.142 This “place-of-organization” 
 
 140. See generally Dale, supra note 22 (discussing the lack of tax-exempt status for foreign 
charities). For example, tax law applies several “place of use” restrictions. Corporate donors may 
generally not deduct charitable contributions unless the funds are used for domestic purposes. 
However, this limitation applies only to recipients that are trusts or unincorporated associations; it 
does not apply to corporate donees. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2010). Thus, corporate donors can easily avoid 
the place-of-use limitation by giving contributions to corporate donees. Private foundations must 
satisfy additional requirements if they make grants to foreign, as opposed to domestic, organizations. 
Private foundations must either make an equivalency determination or exercise expenditure 
responsibility for foreign grant making in order to have foreign grants be counted toward minimum 
distribution requirements and to avoid excise taxes on prohibited taxable distributions. I.R.C §§ 4942, 
4945 (2010). 
 141. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A) (2010). The limitation applies even if the foreign charity qualifies for 
tax-exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 142. Dale, supra note 18, at 660. 
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restriction was adopted in 1938.143 Here is the often-cited passage in the 
legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1938: 
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to 
charitable or other purposes is based upon the theory that the 
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from 
financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by 
appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from 
the promotion of general welfare. The United States derives no such 
benefit from gifts to foreign institutions, and the proposed limitation is 
consistent with the above theory.144 
This limitation has been persuasively described as bad history, bad 
philosophy, and bad logic.145 It is bad history because there was no 
Congressional quid pro quo requirement that charitable activities relieve 
the government of an expense before allowing deductibility.146 This 
requirement would not be satisfied by many types of domestic activities 
that qualify for tax benefits even though the government is not relieved 
of obligations to provide similar good or services. Also, because of the 
current level of private assistance for foreign charitable activities, the 
U.S. government may be relieved of the burden of providing different 
types of foreign aid. It is also bad philosophy, as even in the 1930s this 
was a narrow view of the world in general and of global philanthropy in 
particular.147 Finally, it is bad logic.148 It makes little sense to deny a 
charitable deduction on the basis of where the entity is organized but to 
allow charitable deductions to domestic entities that use some or all of 
their funds outside the U.S.149 
At one level, the place-of-organization restriction merely increases 
the transaction costs of providing funds for charitable activities outside 
the U.S. Individuals can donate to public charities or private foundations 
in order to structure their giving to avoid restrictions on direct 
contributions to foreign charities. It is also easy for many established 
foreign charities to create “friends of” organizations. These organizations 
are established to allow U.S. contributors to make donations to a U.S. 
entity that then transfers amounts to a specific charitable organization 
outside the U.S.150 As long as the organization does not act as a mere 
 
 143. Id. (stating that the restriction was adopted in 1938 for individuals and in 1935 for corporations). 
 144. H.R. Rep. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938). 
 145. Dale, supra note 18, at 660, 661. 
 146. Id. at 660–61.  
 147. Id. at 661. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. A domestic corporation’s “activities are charitable within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) 
of the Code when carried on within the United States, the conduct of such activities elsewhere does 
not preclude the organization from qualifying as an exempt organization under that section.” Rev. 
Rul. 71-460, 1971-2 C.B. 231. 
 150. The “friends of” organizations must meet certain statutory requirements and must file annual 
returns with the IRS. See Rev. Rul. 69-80, 1969-1 C.B. 65.  
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conduit to the foreign charity, U.S. donors can secure deductions for 
charitable contributions that are effectively made to foreign charities.151 
Internet platforms also allow for U.S. donors to choose foreign 
beneficiaries by effectively using the public charity status of a charitable 
intermediary. These platforms reduce transaction costs for individuals 
seeking to fund foreign projects. For example, GlobalGiving provides 
individuals with funding opportunities for education, health, and other 
types of projects in different countries.152 While these organizations do 
provide some oversight as to how funds are spent, because of their public 
charity status they are not subject to the strict expenditure responsibilities 
applicable to private foundations.153 
Assume for purposes of this discussion that there was no problem in 
monitoring the activities of either domestic or foreign charities (or that 
the proportion of charities behaving badly was the same), and assume 
that it is already possible to give deductible donations to foreign 
organizations, albeit with higher transaction costs. It seems that under 
these assumptions, we would want those organizations that were the 
most efficient providers of charitable services to receive tax subsidies. 
There seems little reason for the U.S. tax system to favor less effective 
U.S. charities over more effective foreign charities. We should want the 
donations and the matching federal funds to go to the charities that 
provide the highest quality assistance.154 
Strong arguments also exist for allowing U.S. donors to take 
advantage of regulatory regimes that are more effective in approving and 
monitoring charities than are the IRS and state attorneys general. The 
United Kingdom’s Charity Commission likely provides more effective 
oversight of U.K. charitable organizations than do U.S. oversight 
mechanisms.155 
The strongest rationale for requiring a domestic entity as a pass-
through for funds sent overseas is to increase accountability and 
transparency. This allows the IRS and state governments to have some 
oversight of the activities, even though the funds are spent outside the 
U.S. If deductibility under Internal Revenue Code section 170 requires 
the IRS to determine that the contributions are used exclusively for 
 
 151. See Rev. Rul. 74-229, 1974-1 C.B. 142. 
 152. See About Us, GlobalGiving, http://www.globalgiving.org/aboutus/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 153. See supra note 65.  
 154. For example, Israeli charities provided assistance to Haiti by funding aid groups with 
substantial experience in recovery and rescue efforts, medical assistance, and structural engineering. 
Israeli and Jewish Aid Groups Provide Relief to Haiti, Israel Project, http://www.theisraelproject.org/ 
site/apps/nlnet/content3.aspx?c=asIOI5NJKeK0F&b=7676971&ct=11139149#.Tp5Zgs3oIzw (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2011). Under current law, U.S. donors would not be allowed to deduct amounts contributed 
to Israeli charities even though these charities may be the most effective aid providers. 
 155. Kevin E. Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-to-Peer Financing for Development: Regulating the 
Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1209, 1261–63 (2010). 
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charitable purposes and that no part of the earnings inure to the benefit 
of any private individual, it is important to have a U.S. intermediary, 
especially where the IRS lacks the ability and authority to audit activities 
outside the U.S.156 
Oversight concerns take on added importance in the post-
September 11, 2001 world. The use of charitable organizations to support 
terrorist activities makes the cost of abuses related to foreign charitable 
activities greater than just wasted U.S. tax dollars. While requiring 
foreign charities to use a U.S.-based intermediary may not be entirely 
effective in limiting the flow of funds to terrorist organizations, it 
potentially provides some help in limiting such abuses.157 
If we wish to extend tax benefits to foreign charities, then there are 
several alternatives that may facilitate donations while minimizing 
chances of abuse.158 First, foreign charities could apply for the right to 
receive tax-deductible contributions in the same way they can currently 
apply for tax-exempt status, just as foreign publicly held corporations are 
required to comply with certain disclosure and other requirements to 
have their stock listed on national stock exchanges.159 Second, we could 
adopt an “approved foreign charity list” of those foreign charities that 
satisfy certain criteria based on a review by the IRS or the State 
Department, or some other agency. This approach shares much in 
common with the current Canadian system, in which individual taxpayers 
are allowed to deduct contributions to foreign charities as long as the 
Canadian government also has contributed to those charities.160 Third, 
the existing tax-treaty network could be used to provide for deductibility 
of contributions to foreign charities on a country-by-country basis. 
Currently, the U.S. provides treaty relief for U.S. residents, generally 
allowing them to reduce their foreign-source income through donations 
to charities in Canada, Israel, and Mexico.161 Finally, we could adopt a 
 
 156. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L. Rev. 85, 
103 (1985). 
 157. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary 
Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities (2002) (suggesting charities use governing instruments, 
independent oversight, publication of key employees, and records to account for disbursements, 
among other suggestions to help ensure donations are directed towards charitable purposes).  
 158. Pozen, supra note 10, at 594–96. 
 159. Foreign charities currently can apply for tax-exempt status in the U.S. to qualify for certain 
federal, state, and local tax benefits.  
 160. See Can. Revenue Agency, No. IC84-3R6, Gifts to Certain Charitable Organizations 
Outside Canada (2010).  
 161. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Mex. art. 22, Sept. 18, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-7 
(1993); Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can. art. XX, Sept. 26, 
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,087; Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the State of Israel with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Isr. art. 23, 25, Nov. 20, 
1975, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-7 (1981). If this alternative is adopted, then the benefits could be 
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“substantial equivalent” approach, where charities in those countries 
whose charitable regulations meet some minimum guidelines would be 
eligible to receive deductible contributions. 
B. Consequences of Extending Tax Benefits to Foreign Charitable 
Activities 
There are three major consequences of extending greater tax 
benefits to foreign charitable activities, whether in the form of less 
restrictive rules for domestic charities engaged in development assistance 
or allowing deductions for contributions made directly to foreign 
charities: (1) the potential effects on the quality and quantity of goods 
and services provided, (2) the interaction with other providers of 
development assistance, and (3) the substitution away from support to 
domestic charities. 
1. Effects on Quality and Quantity 
The desirability of extending tax benefits to foreign charitable 
activities depends largely on the effectiveness of foreign charities in 
providing assistance as compared to other alternatives. A key question is 
how, and how much, charities will improve the quality and quantity of 
collective goods and services in the countries in which they operate, if a 
deduction were allowed. The alternatives include not only increasing the 
tax benefits allocable to domestic charitable activities, but also increased 
government support for official development assistance (either directly 
or through grants to charities and other providers), multilateral 
organizations, or simply lower taxes. 
It is likely that U.S. and foreign charities will act differently from 
governments or multilateral agencies.162 To the extent that U.S. 
government aid policy is strongly influenced by foreign policy concerns, 
there is a greater role for tax subsidies for foreign charitable activities. 
In examining the potential gains from increased tax benefits, I offer 
a few observations. First, the private sector may be more effective in 
providing certain types of goods and services than are U.S. government 
programs (either directly provided or funded and supervised by the 
United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”)). 
Perhaps we subsidize charitable contributions not as a matter of tax 
policy, but rather as a means of achieving public goals.163 Subsidized 
 
expanded by relaxing limitations with respect to foreign-source income. 
 162. Raj M. Desai & Homi Kharas, Do Philanthropic Citizens Behave Like Governments? 1 
(Wolfensohn Ctr. for Dev. at Brookings, Working Paper No. 12, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1492214. 
 163. Schizer, supra note 41, at 255–58. While David Schizer’s focus is primarily on the U.S. 
nonprofit sector, much of his discussion of recruiting nongovernment donors to monitor the quality of 
nonprofit organizations applies with equal or perhaps even greater force to foreign activities. 
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charities represent one of many tools available to governments. We 
could then justify the charitable tax deduction in part because it provides 
incentives for donors to monitor the quality of nonprofit organizations. 
The Gates Foundation has substantial resources and financial and 
reputational incentives to monitor the activities of its health-care 
programs in Africa, and the benefits may be greater than those provided 
by similar U.S. government programs.164 
Second, foreign charities may have advantages based on access to 
information, lower operating expenses due to proximity, and greater 
knowledge of local challenges than U.S.-based charities. Apart from 
compliance and enforcement concerns, tax subsidies should support 
those organizations that are the most efficient providers of goods and 
services. Expanding the pool of eligible recipients of tax-deductible 
contributions to foreign charities likely will yield additional benefits from 
the support of the development of a nonprofit sector in developing 
countries. 
Third, private U.S. donors, domestic charities, and foreign charities 
may be better able to deal with political challenges as well as corruption 
issues in developing countries than can the U.S. government, World 
Bank, or other government or quasi-government providers. Charities 
operating in many countries face similar challenges due to political 
pressures or corrupt officials, but the consequences of confronting these 
pressures or corruption are very different for private actors than for 
government providers that may have a larger and more complex agenda 
in these countries. 
2. Interaction with Other Providers 
One consequence of increasing tax benefits for foreign charitable 
activities is that U.S. donors may play a greater role in foreign charitable 
activities. In the domestic context, the nonprofit sector can play a 
supplementary role, a complementary role, or an adversarial role with 
respect to the U.S. government.165 This same framework could apply in 
the international environment, by expanding the frame of reference to 
include multiple governments as well as international institutions. Thus, 
for example, the interaction could be supplementary, whereby U.S. 
donors could fulfill directly (or provide additional support to foreign 
charities that fulfill) the demand for public goods that is not completely 
satisfied by the local government, other foreign governments, or other 
international institutions. The interaction could also be complementary 
in that U.S. donors could coordinate with other aid providers to increase 
 
 164. See Global Health Program, Bill & Melinda Gates Found., http://www.gatesfoundation.org/ 
global-health/Pages/overview.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 165. Dennis R. Young, Complementary, Supplementary, or Adversarial? Nonprofit-Government 
Relations, in Nonprofit & Government, supra note 18, at 37. 
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the effectiveness of the assistance. The gains from decentralization of 
charitable activities are increased diversity and innovation. The cost is 
the lack of coordination either among other donors or with government 
agencies. Finally, the interaction could be adversarial in that U.S. donors 
could challenge either the policy of the U.S. or foreign governments or of 
international agencies. Nongovernmental organizations may face special 
challenges where their beliefs and preferences differ from those held by 
U.S. agencies or other providers of funding.166 U.S. government or local 
governments could also try to influence the behavior of nonprofits 
through regulation or other institutional responses. 
3. Substitution Away from Domestic Charities 
While extending tax benefits to foreign charitable activities may 
increase total contributions from U.S. donors, these changes may result 
in substitution away from U.S. charities, particularly U.S. charities 
engaged in foreign activities. It is difficult to estimate the amount of 
substitution, but one would expect some substitution away from domestic 
to international activities. It is also difficult to measure whether there will 
be a substitution effect away from U.S. charities engaged in foreign 
activities to foreign charities. 
IV.  Should the Tax System Extend Tax Benefits to For-Profit 
Entities Engaged in Charitable Activities, Including 
Foreign For-Profit Entities? 
So far, this Article has addressed issues related to the domicile of 
the charitable organization, but it is also important to focus on the 
charity’s corporate structure. Historically, tax law generally adopted a 
binary approach to for-profit and nonprofit organizations, with for-profit 
organizations subject to income tax and only nonprofit organizations 
qualifying for tax-exempt status and receiving tax-deductible 
contributions. In recent years, however, there has been a substantial 
increase in entities that blur the traditional boundaries between for-
profit and nonprofit entities. Two trends are clear: nonprofit 
organizations are adopting more profit-oriented approaches, and some 
for-profit organizations are adopting charitable missions. Joint ventures 
between for-profit and nonprofit organizations are becoming more 
common and raise important governance and transparency issues.167 
The label “for-profit charities” covers many different types of 
entities. Depending on the context, for-profit charities could include 
charities that look and operate a lot like for-profit entities, such as 
 
 166. Janelle A. Kerlin, U.S.-Based International NGOs and Federal Government Foreign 
Assistance: Out of Alignment?, in Nonprofit & Government, supra note 18, at 373. 
 167. Sarah Dadush, Profiting in (RED): The Need for Enhanced Transparency in Cause-Related 
Marketing, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1269, 1312–19 (2010). 
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hospitals, museums, and symphony orchestras, or the “related” activities 
such as universities operating bookstores, conference facilities, or 
basketball or football teams. It also could include the for-profit 
subsidiaries of tax-exempt entities. Particularly in the health-care field, it 
is common for nonprofit organizations to have for-profit subsidiaries and 
for nonprofit entities to convert to for-profit status.168 Finally, there are 
for-profit companies that engage in activities that are similar to the 
charitable activities of tax-exempt charities.169 It is this last type of entity 
that has been the subject of recent academic scholarship.170 
Domestically, scholars have proposed allowing donors to make tax-
deductible contributions to for-profit entities engaged in charitable 
activities and have considered alternatives for increasing the role of for-
profit entities in charitable activities.171 Should we, or can we, apply this 
analysis to the role of foreign charities? 
A. Tax Benefits for For-Profit Charities 
The most influential examination of charitable activities by for-
profit entities is Anup Malani and Eric Posner’s case for granting 
nonprofit charitable organization tax treatment to for-profit charities.172 
Ultimately, though, their conclusions assume a consistent rationale for 
the deductibility of charitable donations, and, as we have seen, that 
internal consistency may be lacking.173 Like other scholars, Malani and 
Posner note that the level of desirable collective goods is less than 
socially optimal and that government subsidies may be necessary to 
increase the level of production of these desirable goods and services.174 
Malani and Posner argue that if our objective is to increase the level of 
these goods and services, then nonprofit organizations are not the only, 
or even the best, game in town.175 As discussed below, similar arguments 
may support extending charitable deductions for foreign charities and, 
perhaps, other foreign organizations engaged in charitable activities. 
Malani and Posner nicely frame the question as one of “linkage” or 
“coupling”—why is a particular tax benefit designed to promote 
 
 168. James J. Fishman, Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble Spots in the 
Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Organizations to For-Profit Status, 23 Iowa J. Corp. L. 701, 708 
(1998).  
 169. Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2019–20; see, e.g., Google.org, http://www.google.org/ 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (website for Google, Inc.’s for-profit entity with philanthropic goals).  
 170. E.g., Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1213 (2010); Hines et al., supra 
note 113; Malani & Posner, supra note 30. 
 171. Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2029–30.  
 172. Id. at 2019.  
 173. See supra notes 100–121 and accompanying text. 
 174. Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2030. 
 175. Id. at 2055 (“An underlying theme of this Essay is that nonprofit firms are less efficient than 
for-profit firms . . . .”). 
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charitable activities conditioned on a particular corporate form?176 To 
answer that question, they examine several leading theories, two of 
which are discussed below, for why government support of charitable 
activities is necessary and desirable. They contend that decoupling would 
yield greater and more efficient production of these essential collective 
goods and services.177 These gains would come from increased 
competition for charitable donations between for-profit and nonprofit 
charities, from improvement in operating efficiencies for nonprofit 
charities through better incentives for managers and incentives for 
minimizing costs, and from “economies of scope” achieved by allowing 
for-profit charities to achieve gains and scale efficiencies from the 
noncharitable activities of the organization.178 
Malani and Posner begin with the “public good” theory for 
government support for voluntary contributions to increase the level of 
collective goods and services.179 Their insight is that what is important is 
the end result (higher levels of collective goods and services), not the 
means of getting there (who actually provides the goods and services).180 
Allowing for-profit charities to receive tax-deductible contributions may 
also further the goal of decentralization of decisionmaking, as more and 
different entities will engage in the charitable activities. 
Similarly, Malani and Posner respond to the “agency” theory that 
the nondistribution constraint for the nonprofit form provides comfort to 
donors that funds will be used exclusively for charitable purposes.181 
Malani and Posner consider the costs and benefits of imposing a 
nondistribution constraint.182 They note that parties could use contract 
law to simulate the nondistribution constraint for all or part of profits 
from activities.183 In addition, private parties could certify that for-profit 
charities comply with any nondistribution requirement.184 They thus 
conclude that the agency theory does not provide an adequate basis for 
distinguishing between nonprofit and for-profit charities.185 
Malani and Posner’s call for tax subsidies for for-profit charities has 
drawn much criticism, on a variety of grounds. There are serious 
concerns at each step. Any efficiency gains made by virtue of for-profit 
 
 176. Id. at 2021. Bill Klein and I adopted a similar approach in questioning why limited-liability 
status and favorable tax regimes were linked to a particular corporate form. William A. Klein & Eric 
M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 
66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1001, 1007 (1995). 
 177. Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2055. 
 178. Id. at 2027, 2056, 2063. 
 179. Id. at 2047–51. 
 180. Id. at 2049.  
 181. Id. at 2031–41. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. at 2036. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. at 2029. 
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status would be undermined by the costs of monitoring and 
enforcement,186 and decoupling tax subsidies from the nonprofit form 
creates new opportunities for tax arbitrage.187 Particularly challenging is 
the application of the current vague criteria for eligible charitable 
activities of currently tax-exempt entities to for-profit entities engaging in 
a wide range of activities.188 
I agree with most of these criticisms, but my take is different. I 
challenge the framing of Malani and Posner’s argument. They make a 
persuasive case that existing theories (as well as their additional theories) 
do not provide adequate rationales for denying tax benefits to for-profit 
charities.189 But where does this take us? 
Here is one way to frame their argument: (1)  The leading existing 
theories for allowing tax-deductible charitable contributions are A, B, 
and C; (2) theories A, B, and C do not distinguish based on for-profit and 
nonprofit forms of organization; (3) therefore, the leading theories do 
not provide a basis for distinguishing between for-profit and nonprofit 
charitable organizations; and (4) therefore, we should allow deductions 
for contributions made to for-profit charities. 
I agree that existing theories of subsidizing charitable activities do 
not provide a clear basis for distinguishing tax-favored status based on 
form of organization. Accepting this failure, there are at least two 
possible outcomes. One, adopted by Malani and Posner, is that we 
should allow both nonprofit and for-profit organizations to qualify for 
tax subsidies as long as they are engaged in charitable activities.190 This 
accepts 1 and 2 as true and provides support for conclusions 3 and 4. 
But another conclusion is acknowledging that existing theories of 
subsidizing charities are inadequate. At one level this is not surprising. 
Existing theories are not particularly helpful in deciding which types of 
activities deserve charitable support or whether domestic altruism should 
rule over foreign altruism. So even though logically 1 and 2 are true and 
support the conclusion in 3, it does not necessarily follow that conclusion 
4 is valid. 
B. For-Profit Charities and Foreign Charitable Activities 
Many similarities exist between providing charitable tax benefits to 
for-profit charities and providing charitable tax benefits to foreign 
charities. The gains are similar. Why constrain donors’ choices? If the 
goal is to increase levels of underprovided goods and services, we should 
not limit the options available to those willing to fund these activities. By 
 
 186. Galle, supra, note 170, at 1233. 
 187. Hines et al., supra note 113, at 1214–15. 
 188. Schizer, supra note 41, at 254–55. 
 189. Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2029.  
 190. Id. at 2065.  
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increasing the pool of potential providers of collective goods and 
services, we should increase both the quality and quantity of these goods 
and services. As discussed earlier, foreign charities may bring expertise 
and perspective to challenges in their countries that will be different and 
perhaps better than those provided by U.S. charities, even those U.S. 
charities that rely on local organizations to help design and administer 
their programs. 
The challenges are also quite similar. Because of challenges in 
enforcement, it may be necessary to define more strictly the class of 
eligible activities (and perhaps eligible recipients).191 There would be a 
trade-off between greater diversity in activities and a greater opportunity 
for abuse. 
The for-profit charity debate provides an opportunity to think about 
alternatives to encourage charitable activity other than the current form 
of the charitable tax deduction. The charitable tax deduction is not the 
only tool for government to increase the role of the private sector in 
charitable activities. Other government programs or tax subsidies can 
increase private sector participation in charitable activities. These types 
of government subsidies avoid some of the challenges of extending tax 
deductibility for contributions to for-profit charities, but may invoke a 
different set of challenges and opportunities. 
One alternative is to increase the level of government grants and 
contracts to for-profit firms to perform charitable activities. Since the 
1970s, USAID, the government’s foreign aid agency, has changed its 
approach from providing goods and services directly to using third-party 
contractors to provide foreign assistance.192 These contractors are both 
for-profit and nonprofit organizations. To the extent that USAID is 
successful in monitoring contractors and evaluating performance, one 
would expect the more efficient providers to succeed, especially given 
the repeat nature of these contractual arrangements. These government 
grants and contracts could also provide direct support for foreign 
charities or for-profit groups or require U.S.-based providers to partner 
with local providers. 
While this approach provides for monitoring activities of the for-
profit providers, it also restricts the types of programs subsidized to those 
chosen by USAID or other government agencies. The distribution of 
government funds under this arrangement will reflect political and other 
priorities that may or may not match the set of charitable objectives 
preferred by society at large. In other areas, such as basic scientific 
 
 191. The current list of permitted charitable activities (as well as the regulatory regime) was adopted 
by Congress with an explicit “no private inurement” requirement. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
(c)(2) (2010). It is interesting to think about what permitted activities and what regulatory regime would 
make sense if we allowed for-profit entities to qualify for charitable tax benefits.  
 192. Kerlin, supra note 166, at 375.  
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research or the promotion of the arts, Congress has, with varying success, 
established quasi-independent boards to select and monitor recipients of 
government funds. Boards such as the National Science Foundation or 
the National Endowment for the Arts seek to provide funding to those 
organizations that will yield the greatest benefits (according to proposed 
mission) with, one hopes, minimal interference from the political process. 
One could imagine a similar board with responsibility for allocating 
funds to address issues tied to foreign charitable activities with the class 
of potential recipients broad enough to include foreign charities and for-
profit firms, as well as domestic charities. 
Finally, Congress has traditionally supported charitable activities by 
providing subsidies to the tax-exempt entities engaged in charitable 
activity. An alternative approach would provide tax subsidies to support 
activities rather than entities. For example, Congress could provide 
refundable targeted tax credits for specific activities related to foreign 
charitable activities. Targeted tax credits are used for a variety of 
purposes, including increasing research and development, development 
of orphan drugs, and alternative energy sources.193 Similar tax credits 
could be designed to provide incentives for U.S. for-profit organizations 
to engage in specific types of charitable activities. Malani and Posner 
offer a variation of this approach, which combines targeted charitable 
activities and the charitable deduction.194 Their plan would allow donors 
to make tax-deductible contributions for a particular charitable activity 
(but not to a charitable organization), but have the government choose 
the particular organization that would receive funding.195 This alternative 
would provide policymakers with information about donor preferences 
without coupling the receipt of donated funds to nonprofit status. 
Conclusion 
This Article examines the tax regime governing charitable deductions 
for foreign assistance both to determine how the regime should be 
changed and also to see what insights might emerge on the desirability of 
using the tax system to subsidize charitable activities. The current tax 
regime generally allows U.S. taxpayers to deduct contributions to 
domestic charities with foreign activities but not to foreign charities and 
not to for-profit charities, including those engaged in charitable activities 
outside the U.S. These decisions cannot easily be reconciled. The 
challenges begin because of limitations in the basic theories justifying tax 
benefits for charitable activities. The challenges may be even greater 
when charitable assistance crosses national boundaries. Perhaps donors 
 
 193. I.R.C. §§ 41, 45C, 48C (2010). 
 194. Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2052. 
 195. Id.  
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should not be allowed to decide without limitations how matching funds 
are provided for foreign charitable assistance. The donor-focused 
theories offer little or no guidance as to which charitable activities merit 
support, or whether to impose geographical limitations on either the use 
of the donation or the location of the charitable organization. Theories 
based on market failures may yield different conclusions depending on 
the type of charitable activity and the extent of market failure in a given 
geographical area. For those activities where most of the benefits accrue 
to foreign persons, perhaps the gains from a U.S. perspective of using the 
tax system to fund these activities are not worth the lost tax revenue. For 
theories based on political failures, it is not clear that the same 
considerations that allow donors to dictate in the domestic context apply 
to choices made with respect to foreign charitable activity. It may be that 
a different type of matching program that better targets federal funds to 
specific types of activities and to specific countries would yield a more 
effective and more representative subsidy program than that achieved 
under current tax law. 
These theories justifying tax benefits for charitable activities are also 
flawed in their failure to address issues that arise in cross-border 
philanthropy. For example, the subsidy theories for charitable 
contributions assume a simple three-sector model of a government, a 
private sector, and a nonprofit sector and a single society in which voting, 
contributions, and subsidies take place. These theories do not reflect 
either the preferences of the recipient country or its citizens or the role of 
other multilateral institutions, foreign governments, bilateral aid 
agencies, and other foreign charities in providing assistance. It may be 
that there is an optimal amount of tax subsidy for foreign charitable 
activities, and that amount would vary over time given other programs’ 
needs, government aid policies, and revenue constraints. But perhaps the 
government, and not private donors, should determine the level of public 
foreign assistance. 
The question of the relative tax treatment of foreign charities and 
domestic charities may be the easiest to answer. If we want to continue to 
encourage foreign charitable activity, the objective should be to provide 
tax subsidies to those charities that could provide the highest quality 
goods and services at the lowest costs. It seems likely that for some types 
of activities, U.S.-based charities would have comparative advantages in 
providing these goods and services. But for other types of activities, such 
as disaster relief for victims of the Japanese earthquake, foreign charities 
likely have a better understanding of needs and challenges in their home 
countries, better access to information, and lower operating costs. In 
many cases, a combination approach may be best.196 It is thus hard to 
 
 196. Recent efforts at reducing the costs and obligations of U.S. foundations in making grants to 
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rationalize the current prohibition against tax deductions for direct 
contributions to foreign charities, for at least two reasons. First, the 
compliance and enforcement challenges of allowing deductions for 
contributions to foreign charities can be addressed by such measures as 
the IRS maintaining an “approved foreign charity” list or by adopting a 
“substantial equivalent” approach, whereby charities in those countries 
whose charitable regulations meet some minimum guidelines would 
qualify to receive tax-deductible contributions. Second, it is hard to 
justify such a prohibition and at the same time allow easy (but not 
costless) avoidance of the restrictions through either a “friends of” 
organization structure that allows several foreign charities access to U.S. 
tax subsidies or through donors establishing private foundations to direct 
foreign assistance. 
Whether to extend tax benefits to for-profit entities engaged in 
charitable activities is a harder question to answer. Extending tax 
subsidies to for-profit charities presents many opportunities for gain or 
abuse similar to those presented by extending tax subsidies to foreign 
charities. Merely because several of the existing theories justifying the 
charitable deduction provide no clear basis for distinguishing between 
nonprofit and for-profit charities, it does not follow that a strong case 
exists for allowing tax deduction for contributions to for-profit charities. 
Nor do I believe that the similarities between foreign charities and for-
profit charities mean that the policy responses are necessarily the same. 
Finally, the challenges in designing a sensible regime for foreign 
charitable assistance highlight many of the weaknesses of the current 
charitable deduction regime applicable to domestic charitable activities. 
Two unrelated recent events bring the charitable deduction into greater 
focus: the billionaires’ pledge, which will generate substantial funds for 
charitable activities, and the recent tax reform proposals that call for the 
repeal of many personal deductions and for changing the current tax 
regime for charitable contributions. At a general level, these events 
present squarely the “take it or leave it” approach to the charitable 
deduction. If we provide matching funds to support the billionaires’ 
choices of which charities merit federal funds, we recognize the benefits 
and costs of the current regime and conclude that the benefits from the 
additional funds (as well as the benefits from engaging these donors in 
these charitable activities) outweigh the lost tax revenue and other costs 
that result from allowing donors to dictate how matching federal funds 
are spent. If we simply repeal the charitable deduction, we lose the 
incremental gains that result from the federal tax subsidy for charitable 
contributions and regain public control of public funds. 
 
foreign charities are helpful in providing charitable services and supporting these foreign charities. 
Advisory Comm. on Tax Exempt & Gov’t Entities, supra note 82, at 6. 
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The “bang for the buck” approach may present a compromise to the 
extremes set forth above. It recognizes that the current regime for 
charitable deductions creates value, but perhaps not enough value for its 
costs, broadly defined. In thinking about changes to the current 
charitable deduction regime, many of the alternatives that arise in the 
context of designing government subsidies, including tax benefits, for 
foreign charitable assistance warrant examination not just abroad but in 
the domestic context as well. We should give serious consideration to 
narrowing the definition of charity for the purposes of the tax deduction 
(and perhaps for tax-exempt status), creating matching grant programs 
different than those inherent in the current charitable deduction, 
matching deductions for specific activities rather than entities, and 
designing better procedures for approving tax-exempt status and 
monitoring activities. Charity may begin at home—but perhaps clear 
thinking about it begins abroad. 
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Appendix A: Individuals Signing the Giving Pledge and 
Estimates of Current Wealth197 
 
Last Name(s) First Name(s) Age(s) Net Worth (in billions) 
Allen Paul 58 $12.7 
Arnold Laura & John 37 $3.3 
Berggruen Nicolas 49 $2.2 
Bloomberg Michael 69 $18.0 
Broad Eli & Edythe 77 & 74 $5.8 
Buffett Warren 80 $45.0 
Case Jean & Steve 52 & 53 $1.1 
Chan & Soon-Shiong Michele & Patrick 59 $5.6 
Cooperman Lee & Toby 67 $1.5 
Cummings Joyce & Bill * * 
Dalio Ray & Barbara 62 $6.0 
DeJoria John Paul 67 $4.2 
Diller & Von Furstenberg Barry & Diane 69 & 64 $1.2 
Doerr Ann & John 59 $1.6 
Ellison Larry 66 $27.0 
Feeney Charles * * 
Forstmann Ted 71 $1.6 
Frost Phillip & Patricia 74 $2.3 
Gates Bill & Melinda 55 & 47 $54.0 
Green David & Barbara 69 $2.6 
Greene Jeff 56 $1.8 
Hamm Harold & Sue Ann 65 $8.6 
Hill Lyda * * 
Hilton Barron 83 $2.5 
Huntsman Jon & Karen * * 
Icahn Carl 75 $11.0 
Jacobs Joan & Irwin 77 $1.1 
Kaiser George 68 $9.4 
Khosla Vinod & Neeru 56 $1.4 
Kimmel Sidney 83 $1.1 
Kinder Rich & Nancy 66 $7.4 
Langone Elaine & Ken 75 $1.1 
Lenfest Gerry & Marguerite * * 
Lokey Lorry * * 
Lucas George 66 $3.3 
MacMillan Duncan & Nancy * * 
Mann Alfred 85 $1.2 
Mansueto Joe & Rika 54 $1.2 
Marcus Bernie & Billi 81 $1.5 
Milken Michael & Lori 64 $2.1 
 
 197. The Giving Pledge, http://www.thegivingpledge.org/#enter (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); The 
World’s Billionaires, Forbes.com (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/wealth/billionaires/list.  
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Last Name(s) First Name(s) Age(s) Net Worth (in billions) 
Mitchell George 91 $2.0 
Monaghan Thomas * * 
Morgridge Tashia & John 77 $1.3 
Moskovitz Dustin 26 $1.4 
Omidyar Pierre & Pam 44 $5.5 
Osher Bernard & Barbro * * 
Perelman Ronald 68 $11.0 
Peterson Peter 84 $2.0 
Pickens T. Boone 82 $1.4 
Robertson, Jr. Julian 79 $2.2 
Rockefeller David 95 $2.2 
Rose Edward & Deedie * * 
Rubenstein David 61 $2.0 
Sandler Herb & Marion * * 
Sanford Denny * * 
Sant Vicki & Roger * * 
Schusterman Lynn 72 $2.0 
Scott, Jr. Walter 79 $1.9 
Secunda Tom & Cindy 56 $1.0 
Simmons Annette & Harold 80 $5.7 
Simons Jim & Marilyn 72 $8.7 
Skoll Jeff * * 
Steyer & Taylor Tom & Kat * * 
Stowers Jim & Virginia * * 
Turner Ted 72 $1.9 
Weill Sanford & Joan * * 
White Shelby * * 
Zegar Charles & Merryl * * 
Zuckerberg Mark 26 $6.9 
 
*  indicates information not available 
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Appendix B: Household Giving by Subsector of Income and 
Charity Type ($ in Billions)198 
 
 
 Charity Type 
Household Income Religious Combined Help MeetBasic Needs Health Education Arts Other Total 
<$100,000 59.96 7.70 9.34 3.06 2.69 1.01 6.16 89.92
$100,000 to $200,000 11.39 2.16 2.46 1.12 1.14 0.44 1.17 19.88
$200,000 to $1 million 21.01 10.19 5.30 4.81 29.15 13.57 7.45 91.48
$1 million or more 8.64 2.06 1.93 12.97 12.94 7.88 4.85 51.27
Total 101.00 22.11 19.03 21.96 45.92 22.90 19.63 252.55
 
 
 198. Center on Philanthropy at Ind. U., supra note 53, at 12. 
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Appendix C: Distribution of U.S. Nonprofit Charitable 
Assistance Efforts by Region199 
 
 
Western Europe, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan 3% 
Global (more than one region) 29%
Latin America and the Caribbean 24%
South and East Asia and the Pacific 15%
Sub-Saharan Africa 11%
Central Europe and Central Asia 10%
The Middle East and North Africa 8%
 
 
 199. Janelle A. Kerlin & Supaporn Thanasombat, The International Charitable Nonprofit Subsector: 
Scope, Size, and Revenue, Nonprofits in Focus, Sept. 2006, at 1, 5 (using 2003 data). 
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Appendix D: Types of Foreign Charitable Activities Supported by 
U.S. Nonprofit Organizations200 
 
Type of Nonprofit Number 




% of total 
revenue 
International development and assistance 
General 866 15% 2,770,563,787 15.65% 
Agricultural development 65 1% 202,131,615 1.14% 
Economic development 200 4% 383,579,680 2.17% 
International relief 1,200 21% 6,412,788,171 36.23% 
Educational development 491 9% 791,543,584 4.47% 
Health development 738 13% 2,455,202,841 13.87% 
Science and technology development 53 1% 46,948,625 0.27% 
Democracy and civil society 
development 93 2% 251,277,539 1.42% 
Environment, population, and 
sustainability 209 4% 1,483,349,607 8.38% 
Human rights, migration, and 
refugees 212 4% 941,816,849 5.32% 
International development and 
assistance subtotal 4,127 74% 15,739,202,298 88.92% 
International understanding 
General 342 6% 349,814,542 1.98% 
International cultural exchange 120 2% 56,155,559 0.32% 
International academic and student 
exchange 263 5% 561,544,247 3.17% 
International exchanges N.E.C. 161 3% 136,662,235 0.77% 
International understanding subtotal 886 16% 1,104,176,583 6.24% 
International affairs 
General 165 3% 151,034,905 0.85% 
Peace and arms control 205 4% 122,172,999 0.69% 
International affairs education 103 2% 486,660,673 2.75% 
National security 37 1% 44,019,940 0.25% 
International economic and trade 
policy 75 1% 52,795,144 0.30% 
International affairs subtotal 585 10% 856,683,661 4.84% 
     
Total international nonprofits 5,598 100% 17,700,062,542 100.00% 
 
 
 200. Id. at 2 (using 2003 data). 
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